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INTRODUCTION

It is perhaps paradoxical that the one area of public law in
which the Warren Court did not make any fundamental contributions is that of administrative law. It is increasingly apparent that a
concern for individual rights that does not focus on the rights of
the individual within the administrative process is bound to be
only partially effective. In our evolving society, the relationship between administrative power and individual rights is 'becoming increasingly important, particularly in the burgeoning area of social
welfare law.
Before his appointment as Chief Justice, Warren E. Burger
made some of the most important lower court contributions to
administrative law. Two of his court of appeals opinions rank as
landmarks in the movement to broaden the due process rights of
individuals dealing with administrative agencies.' It is therefore
scarcely surprising that the Burger Court has focused upon administrative law to a much greater extent than its predecessor. If its
1. Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d
994 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (viewers opposing renewal of television station's license entitled to be heard before FCC); Gonzalez v. Freeman, 334 F.2d 570 (D.C. Cir. 1964)
(determination to debar contractor must follow established procedural standards and
is subject to judicial review).
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administrative law jurisprudence does not form an altogether consistent corpus, it does cover all of the subject's important facets.
This Article discusses the administrative law decisions of the
Burger Court. Those decisions are categorized, and the different
subject areas of administrative law are analyzed. The conclusion
discusses the present Court's administrative law jurisprudence in
relation to that of prior Courts.
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES AND ADMINISTRATIVE POWER

Appointment
The Burger Court has confronted basic questions concerning
the nature of the administrative agency. It is surprising that in
1976 and 1979, almost a century after the first modern agency was
created, 2 the Supreme Court was still dealing with fundamental issues concerning the organization of administrative agencies.
Buckley v. Valeo 3 confirmed the President's exclusive constitutional power to make appointments to federal agencies. At issue
was the constitutionality of key provisions of the Federal Election
Campaign Act, as amended in 1974.4 The 1974 amendments created the Federal Election Commission, charged with administering
and enforcing the Act. The Commission was composed of six voting
members: Two to be appointed by the president pro tempore of
the Senate, two by the Speaker of the House, and two by the President. All appointments were subject to confirmation by both
houses of Congress. 5 The Court held that the appointment scheme
violated article II of the Constitution, which provides for appointment of "Officers of the United States" by the President, subject to
Senate confirmation. 6 The Court construed "Officers of the United
States" broadly, stating that it was intended "to include 'all persons
who can be said to hold an office under the government . . .
[and that] its fair import is that any appointee exercising significant
2. Interstate Commerce Commission, established in 1887. See Interstate Commerce Act, ch. 104, § 11, 24 Stat. 379 (1887) (current version at 49 U.S.C. § 11
(1976)).
3. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
4. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, §§
201-210, 301-302, 88 Stat. 1263 (current version at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-456 (1976), as
amended by Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1979, Pub. L. No.
96-187, §§ 101-106, 112, 93 Stat. 1339).
5. See id. § 208(a) (current version at 2 U.S.C. § 437c(a)(1) (1976), as amended by
Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-187, §§ 105(3),
105(6), 93 Stat. 1339).
6. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
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authority pursuant to the laws of the United States is an 'Officer of
the United States,' " and must be appointed in the manner
prescribed by article II. 7 Unless their selection is provided for
elsewhere in the Constitution, all officers of the United States must
be appointed by the President in accordance with the appointment
clause of article II.
Buckley lends emphasis to the constitutional role of the President as administrative head of the government. Its principle plainly
applies to the typical administrative agency, even those with predominantly legislative and judicial functions. Though Congress may
provide for the independence of such agencies from presidential
control, 8 it cannot exclude the President from the selection process. But Buckley's implications are broader. The Court's farreaching definition of "Officers of the United States" appears applicable to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and many
members of the White House staff. As Buckley expressly states,
"No class or type of officer is excluded because of its special functions." 9 This would mean that Senate confirmation of all but "inferior" OMB and White House officials is required by article II, and
these officials would presumably be subject to far more direct congressional oversight than has been exercised until now.
From this broader point of view, Buckley may be seen as part
of the Court's effort during the past decade to help curb the "imperial presidency"1 that, under Richard Nixon, threatened the
very constitutional structure. On its face, Buckley protects presidential power against congressional infringements. Yet the Court's
reasoning would subject virtually all presidential appointees,
including those in the White House and OMB, to direct congressional control. That result is wholly consistent with the constitutional intent: The President, as administrative chief, possesses a
monopoly over the appointing power, but his appointees are subject to the vital check provided by legislative oversight.
Composition
Few questions are as crucial to administrative law as the composition of the administrative agency itself. This is particularly rele7. 424 U.S. at 126 (citation omitted).
8. See Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 626 (1935).
9. 424 U.S. at 132.
10. See A. SCHLESINGER, THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY (1973). See also Train v.
City of New York, 420 U.S. 35, 45-46 (1975); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683,
711-13 (1974).
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vant because of the prevalence of state agencies whose members
are chosen from the ranks of the regulated interests. More often
than not, the result has been agencies that equate the "public interest" with the interest of those being regulated. For the age-old
question of political science, Quis custodiet ipsos custodes? (Who
will regulatethe regulators?), our system has supplied a new answer: those who are regulated themselves.
Seven years ago, in Gibson v. Berryhill,11 the Court appeared
to strike a blow against agencies composed of members drawn from
those regulated. Friedman v. Rogers12 indicates, however, that the
blow was far from lethal. Friedman concerned a Texas law that required four of the six members of the Texas Optometry Board, the
agency that regulates the practice of optometry, to be members of
the Texas Optometric Association, the professional organization of
optometrists.1 3 The constitutionality of the statute was attacked by
an optometrist who practiced commercially and was therefore ineligible for membership in the Association. He claimed that the
statute violated his due process and equal protection rights by
subjecting him to regulation by the professional faction of optometrists. 4 The statute was also attacked by the Texas Senior Citizens
Association, which claimed that its members had a fourteenth
amendment right to representation of the general public on the
Board. 15 The Court unanimously rejected the constitutional challenge. "[I]t was reasonable," said the Court, "for the legislature to
require that a majority of the Board be drawn from a professional
organization that had demonstrated consistent support for the rules
that the Board would be responsible for enforcing." Plaintiff had
"no constitutional right to be regulated by a Board that is sympathetic to the commercial practice of optometry"; nor was there a
constitutional basis for a "due process claim that the legislature is
16
required to place a representative of consumers on the Board."'
The Court limited Gibson's application to cases where the pecuniary bias of members of the regulatory board interfered with the
right to a fair and impartial hearing.
11. 411 U.S. 564 (1973) (pecuniary interests of members of optometry board
wbo practiced privately disqualified them from adjudicating dispute involving nonprivate practitioners).
12. 440 U.S. 1 (1979).
13. See TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4552-2.02 (Vernon 1976).
14. See Brief for Appellant at 13, 27, Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1 (1979)
(consolidated on appeal with Rogers v. Friedman).

15. See Jurisdictional Statement for Appellant at 12, Friedman v. Rogers, 440
U.S. 1 (1979) (consolidated on appeal with Rogers v. Friedman).
16. 440 U.S. at 18 (citations omitted) (footnotes omitted).
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Delegations of Power
During the past half century, a prime task of administrative
law has been to legitimize the vast delegations of power given to
agencies. In Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan 1 7 and A.L.A. Schechter
Poultry Corp. v. United States 18 the Court sought to control excessive delegations by requiring that Congress establish standards to
limit administrative discretion. More recently the opinions in those
cases have seemed written from another world. Courts have all but
abandoned the view expressed in Panama and Schechter that delegations of power are invalid unless they contain limiting
standards. 19 Wholesale delegations have become the rule in our
administrative law:20 The new touchstone is the "public interest."2' 1
Charles Reich summarized this trend: "The basic theme [is] simple: economic power . . . must be subjected to the 'public in22
terest' "-as defined by the administrator.
The Burger Court, however, has gone out of its way to indicate that the old law on delegation may not be entirely passe. In
National Cable Television Association v. United States, 23 which involved a Federal Communications Commission order revising fees
imposed upon Community Antenna Television systems, the Court
stated the governing rule in terms of the standards requirement:
"Congress, of course, does delegate power to agencies, setting
standards to guide their determination." 2 4 Whether the statute
authorizing agencies to impose fees met the Schechter requirement
was a question the Court did not reach. "But the hurdles revealed
in [Schechter Poultry and Hampton & Co. v. United States] lead us
to read the Act narrowly to avoid constitutional problems." 2 5 The
17. 293 U.S. 388 (1935) (Congress must establish standards when delegating
legislative power).
18. 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (Congress cannot abdicate or transfer to others essential
legislative functions with which it is vested).
19. Though the federal courts continue to use the traditional language, asserting the need for standards for delegations to be upheld, there seem in practice to
be few constitutional restrictions on delegation today. See generally Arizona v.
California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963); Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Connally, 337 F. Supp.
737 (D.D.C. 1971).
20. See, e.g., Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88
HARtv. L. REv. 1669, 1694 (1975); Wright, Book Review, 81 YALE L.J. 575, 586-87
(1972).
21. E.g., National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 224-25
(1943) (FCC to grant applications for licenses that are not contrary to public interest).
22.

C. REICH, THE GREENING OF AMERICA 45 (1970).

23. 415 U.S. 336 (1974).
24. Id. at 342.
25. Id. In Hampton & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928), the Supreme Court held that a congressional delegation of power will not be unconsti-
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Court thus hinted that Schechter remained a potential barrier to
overly broad delegations.
In two 1976 cases the Court expressly restated the standards
requirement as a limitation upon delegations. City of Eastlake v.
Forest City Enterprises26 held that a referendum authorized by the
state constitution did not involve a "delegation" of power, which
would have required standards to guide the voters' decision. The
Chief Justice's majority opinion stated: "Courts have frequently
held in other contexts that a congressional delegation of power to a
regulatory entity must be accompanied by discernible standards, so
that the delegatee's action can be measured for its fidelity to the
legislative will." 2 7 In Federal Energy Administration v. Algonquin
SNG, Inc. 28 the Court repeated the rule that a delegation of power
29
must be accompanied by discernible standards.
Of particular significance is the indication in National Cable
that certain types of power must be exercised directly by Congress
and cannot be delegated by that body.3 0 National Cable rejected
the argument that the FCC's imposition of fees amounted to the
levying of taxes. 3 1 The Court stressed that "[ilt would be such a
sharp break with our traditions to conclude that Congress had bestowed on a federal agency the taxing power"; thus the enabling
statute had to be read "narrowly as authorizing not a 'tax' but a
'fee.' "32 The clear implication is that the power to levy taxes may
not be delegated.
The National Cable case should be compared with Algonquin,
in which the Court held that the Trade Expansion Act33 authorized
the President to impose substantial license fees on imported petroleum in order to reduce petroleum imports. The Court found the
statute gave the President discretion to determine the method
used to adjust imports. This discretion was not limited to quantitative methods such as quotas; monetary methods such as license
fees were also permissible. 34 Nor was it necessary to narrow the
statute's application to avoid any question of an unconstitutional
tutional if it provides an "intelligible principle" to which the agency is directed
to conform.
26. 426 U.S. 668 (1976).
27. Id. at 675 (citations omitted).
28. 426 U.S. 548 (1976).
29. Id. at 559.
30. 415 U.S. at 341-42.
31. See Brief for Petitioner at 42, National Cable Television, Ass'n v. United
States, 415 U.S. 336 (1974).
32. Id. at 341 (citation omitted).
33. Trade Expansion Act of 1962, § 232, 19 U.S.C. § 1862 (1976).
34. 426 U.S. at 559.
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delegation. The standards provided in the law were sufficient to
meet any delegation doctrine attack. 35
In effect, the Algonquin statute was read as authorizing the
President to impose a tax on imported oil. It is distinguishable
from National Cable because the oil fees are imposed on imports,
and the delegation thus relates to foreign affairs. Hence it may be
supported under the flexible tariff cases, 36 as well as by United
States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.3 7 Regardless of how the
case may be distinguished, one is nevertheless left with an uneasy
feeling that the Court has permitted the power to impose substantial taxes to be vested in the executive.
Adjudicatory Power and Jury Trial
It is unquestionable that agencies may be delegated the power
to decide contested cases. Ever since Crowell v. Benson 38 it has
been recognized that delegation of adjudicatory authority does not
conflict with article III's grant of the "judicial power" to the federal
courts.3 9 Administrative law assumes that not all adjudication must
be judicial.4 0 But an unanswered question remained about the relationship between an agency's exercise of adjudicatory authority and
the constitutional right to jury trial in civil cases. 4 1
That question was presented in Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Commission.42 Under the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 197043 penalties up to $10,000 may
be imposed by the Commission upon employers who violate the
statutory duty to maintain safe working conditions. 4 4 Petitioner employers contended that the imposition of penalties of $5,000 and
$600 upon them violated their seventh amendment right to jury
trial "in suits at common law." 45 The Court rejected the conten35. Id.
36. See, e.g., Norwegian Nitrogen Prods. Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294
(1933); J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394 (1928).
37.
38.

299 U.S. 304 (1936).
285 U.S. 22 (1932).

39. U.S. CONST. art. III, §§ 1-2.
40. See generally Davis v. United States Dep't of HEW, 416 F. Supp. 448, 453
(S.D.N.Y. 1976); Mulhearn v. Federal Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 2 N.J. 356,
364-65, 66 A.2d 726, 730 (1949).
41. See U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
42. 430 U.S. 442 (1977).
43. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1976).
44. Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, §§ 5(a)(2), 17(a), 29 U.S.C. 9
654(a)(2), 666(a) (1976).
45. Brief for Petitioner at 32-42, Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety &
Health Review Comm'n, 430 U.S. 442 (1977). See 430 U.S. at 448-49.
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tion, holding that the seventh amendment does not prevent Congress from assigning to an agency the task of adjudicating employment safety violations: "[WIhen Congress creates new statutory
'public rights,' it may assign their adjudication to an administrative
agency with which a jury trial would be incompatible, without
violating the Seventh Amendment's injunction that jury trial is to be
'preserved' on 'suits at common law.' "46
The easy answer to the seventh amendment claim is that the
constitutional right to jury trial in civil cases exists only, as the seventh amendment expressly indicates, in cases where the right was
recognized at common law. It has no application in noncommon
law cases, such as those in equity, admiralty, and bankruptcy.
Administrative proceedings did not exist at common law; they involve statutory requirements and procedures and may be litigated
by the administrative machinery prescribed by the legislature without reference to the jury requirement.
Unfortunately the Court did not confine itself to this simple
approach. Instead the Atlas opinion limits its holding to cases
involving statutorily created "public rights." As another portion of
the opinion puts it
Our prior cases support administrative factfinding in only those
situations involving "public rights," e.g., where the Government
is involved in its sovereign capacity under an otherwise valid
statute creating enforceable public rights. Wholly private tort,
contract, and property cases, as well as a vast range of other
47
cases, are not at all implicated.
The indicated division between "public"
appears unwarranted. According to Crowell v.
compensation case "is one of private right." 4 9
the award of worker's compensation by an
constitutional right to trial by jury?

and "private" rights
Benson, 48 a worker's
Does this mean that
agency violates the

Narrowing the Vires
The Burger Court's attitude toward administrative power is
demonstrated by the restrictive view it has expressed with regard
to delegated powers. The principal administrative law function of
the courts is to keep agencies within their statutory limits. From
46.

430 U.S. at 455 (footnote omitted).

47. Id. at 458.
48.

285 U.S. 22 (1932).

49. Id. at 51.
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this point of view the celebrated Acton aphorism states the root
principle of administrative law. Legal rules, unlike those in the
physical sciences, do not have fixed areas of strains and stresses.
There is a tendency to stretch legal rules to the breaking point
permitted by expediency, to carry out the desired action even at
the risk of illegality. "You cannot blame the Minister for trying it
on," said an English official to counsel at an agency hearing over
50
half a century ago.
SEC v. Sloan 51 was a case of an agency "trying it on" in
which the agency's action was ruled invalid by the Supreme Court.
Section 12k of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 gives the SEC
the authority "summarily to suspend trading in any security . . .
for a period not exceeding ten days" if "in its opinion the public interest and the protection of investors so require."52 In Sloan the
SEC issued a series of consecutive summary orders suspending
trading in a particular stock for over a year. This action was not an
extreme example of the section 12k suspension power; the SEC
had used the power to suspend trading in a security for up to
thirteen years, 53 and the record was replete with suspensions lasting the better part of a year. It is not surprising that Justice
Brennan's concurrence noted "how flagrantly abusive the Securities
54
and Exchange Commission's use of its § 12k authority has been."
The Court held that "tacking" ten-day summary suspension orders for an indefinite period was an abuse of the SEC's authority.
The statute that authorized summary suspensions did not empower
the Commission to issue successive orders to curtail trading in a
security beyond the initial ten-day period. A different situation
would be presented if a second manipulative scheme or improper
activity unrelated to the first scheme was discovered. Only then
could the SEC order a second ten-day suspension. But the Commission is not authorized to issue a series of summary suspension
orders based upon a single set of events or circumstances. 5 5 Not
only is section 12k clear on its face in compelling this result, but "a
1-year suspension as here, without notice or hearing, so obviously
violates fundamentals of due process and fair play that no reason50.

COMMITTEE ON MINISTERS POWERS, M-UTES OF EVIDENCE 75 (1932).

51. 436 U.S. 103 (1978).

52. 15 U.S.C. § 781(k) (1976).
53. 436 U.S. at 123 (Brennan, J., concurring) (citing Brief Amicus Curiae, Canadian Javelin, Ltd., SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103 (1978)).
54. Id. at 123 (Brennan, J., concurring).
55. Id. at 111-12.
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able individual could suppose that Congress intended to authorize
such a thing."56
Sloan involved patent ultra vires action that was rebuffed by
the Burger Court, as it would have been by any of its predecessors. The present Court's own tendency to restrain administrative
power may be seen in cases where an agency's exercise of authority
is not so flagrantly illegal. During the previous quarter century
the Supreme Court had taken a more hospitable posture toward
the scope of agency authority and had been willing to apply a
broad doctrine of implied agency powers. 5 7 Justice Frankfurter's
rationale explains the underlying premise: "[In enacting [delegating] legislation Congress is not engaged in a scientific process
which takes account of every contingency. Its laws are not to be
read as though every i has to be dotted and every t crossed." 5 8
Administrative powers were not to be construed in a niggardly
manner; agencies were to be permitted to exercise not only authority expressly delegated, but also such powers as could reasonably
be implied from the enabling legislation.
This administrative law counterpart of the McCulloch v.
Maryland implied-powers doctrine 59 is being applied in a more
constricted manner by the present Court. The Court has been narrowing the vires of delegating statutes and refusing to read in authority not specifically conferred unless it is necessary, as well as
proper, to exercise the delegated power. Thus, in NAACP v. Federal Power Commission 60 the Court refused to construe the wholesale delegation, limited only by a public interest standard, as a
blank check enabling the agency to take any measure it thought
would further the public interest. According to the opinion, such a
standard "is not a broad license to promote the general public welfare. Rather the words take meaning from the purposes of the
regulatory legislation. '"61 The principal purpose of the Federal
Power Act 62 was to encourage the orderly development of plentiful
supplies of electricity and gas at reasonable prices. 63 The words
56. Id. at 123-24 (Brennan, J., concurring).

57. Extending approximately from 1941, the date of the fourth Morgan case,
United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409 (1941), to 1969.
58. United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 548-49 (1950)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
59. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
60. 425 U.S. 662 (1976).
61. Id. at 669.
62. See § 213(a), 16 U.S.C. § 824(a) (1976).
63. See S. RlP. No. 621, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1935).
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"public interest" in the statutes were a charge to promote this purpose, not a directive to eradicate racial discrimination. Hence the
statutes did not delegate to the Federal Power Commission authority to issue a rule prohibiting discriminatory employment practices by regulated companies.64
More recent decisions refuse to allow agencies to exercise
powers not specifically delegated by Congress. Two 1979 decisions
illustrate this point. FCC v. Midwest Video Corp.65 struck down
FCC rules requiring cable television operators to allow free access
to certain channels by public, educational, governmental, and
leased access users. 6 6 The Court held that the rules were not reasonably necessary to the effective performance of the FCC's responsibility for television regulation and hence were not within the
Commission's authority. In effect, the rules imposed commoncarrier obligations on cable operators. Absent specific authority,
the FCC may not regulate cable systems as common carriers any
more than it may impose such obligations on broadcasters. Authority to compel cable operators to provide common carriage must
come specifically from Congress. 6 7 Similarly, in NLRB v. Catholic
Bishop 6 8 the Court held that the Board had no jurisdiction over lay
teachers in church-operated schools. In the absence of a clear expression of congressional intent to bring teachers in churchoperated schools within NLRB jurisdiction, the Court would not
69
construe the enabling statute to give the Board such jurisdiction.
As seen, the Burger Court has articulated doubts about the
demise of the standards requirement, and these recent decisions
are potential deterrents to uncanalized delegations. But its statements on the matter have thus far been only in the nature of obiter
and have not yet affected the results in specific cases. One result of
the decline of a meaningful standards requirement has been a
growing ineptitude in the drafting of delegating statutes. Instead of
drafting detailed standards, the legislature tends to leave it to the
administrator. As Judge J. Skelly Wright has noted, it is so much
"easier to pass an organic statute with some vague language about
the 'public interest' which tells the agency, in effect, to get the job
64.
65.
66.
42 Fed.
67.
68.
69.

425 U.S. at 669-70.
440 U.S. 689 (1979).
41 Fed. Reg. 20,678 (1976), as amended by 41 Fed. Reg. 56,203 (1976) and
Reg. 19,348 (1977) (current version at 47 C.F.R. § 76,254 (1979)).
440 U.S. at 708-09.
440 U.S. 490 (1979).
Id. at 504. Serious first amendment questions would have been posed had

the Court construed the enabling statute as giving the NLRB such authority. See id.
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done." 70 Prior Courts were willing to look beyond the explicit statutory language and find implied authority in light of what the
Court referred to as " 'the mischief to be corrected and the end to
be attained.' "71 The present Court is no longer willing to assume
implied power from the inadequate draftsmanship that is all too
common in laws containing wholesale delegations.
INFORMATION AND INVESTIGATIONS

Freedom of Information
Another area in which the present Court has refused to correct drafting inadequacies has been in applying the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). 72 Instead, the Court has consistently ruled
that the FOIA provisions must be applied as written, even though
that may lead to undesirable results in individual cases. The leading case is Environmental Protection Agency v. Mink. 7 3 Members
of Congress brought suit under FOIA to compel disclosure of documents that had been prepared for the President concerning a
scheduled underground nuclear test. 74 The documents had been
classified Top Secret or Secret and the Government claimed that
they came within the first exemption of FOIA that then applied to
matters "specifically required by Executive order to be kept secret
in the interest of the national defense or foreign policy." 75 The
court of appeals reversed a summary judgment in the Government's favor, holding that the exemption permits the withholding
of only the secret portions of classified documents, but requires
disclosure of the nonsecret components if separable. 76 The district
court was to examine the documents in camera to determine if the
nonsecret parts were separable. The Supreme Court reversed,
holding that the exemption covers any documents classified pursuant to Executive Order 1050177 and does not permit judicial review
70.

Wright, supra note 20, at 585.

71. NLRB v. Hearst Publications, 322 U.S. 111, 124 (1944) (quoting South
Chicago Coal & Dock Co. v. Bassett, 309 U.S. 251, 259 (1940), quoting Warner v.
Goltra, 293 U.S. 155, 158 (1934)).
72. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976).
73. 410 U.S. 73 (1973).
74. Id. at 75.
75. Act of June 5, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-23, 81 Stat. 54 (current version at 5
U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) (1976)).
76. 464 F.2d 742, 746 (D.C. Cir. 1971), rev'd, 410 U.S. 73 (1973).
77. See 18 Fed. Reg. 7,049 (1953) (superseded by Exec. Order No. 11,652, 37
Fed. Reg. 5,209 (1972)).
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of the validity of the classification. Furthermore, it does not permit
in camera inspection to sift out nonsecret components. The judicial
role under FOIA is limited to determining if the given documents
are classified; FOIA does not subject the soundness of executive
security classifications to judicial review. 78 It is true, as the dissent
emphasized, that FOIA required the court to "determine the matter de novo." 7 9 But the majority held that the only "matter" to be
determined de novo was whether the documents had been classified pursuant to Executive order. The Court's literal application of
the exemption disappointed those who had expected FOIA to
weaken the executive privilege doctine. If Congress intended a different result, an amendment would be necessary. This occurred
when FOIA was substantially amended in 1974.80
A primary purpose of the 1974 amendments was to overrule
Mink in this respect. Under these amendments the first exception
applies only to matters whose secrecy is authorized by an Executive order to protect national defense or foreign policy, and the
documents are in fact properly classified pursuant to such Executive order. 8 ' In an FOIA action, the court is given the express
power to examine the records in camera to determine whether the
records should be withheld under the exception, and may now determine de novo whether an invocation of executive privilege is
82
justified.
But the Court has continued to follow the Mink rule that it
must apply FOIA as written and may not correct legislative lacunae
by judicious judicial interpretation. Thus, in NLRB v. Robbins Tire
& Rubber Co. 8 3 the Court refused to allow FOIA to be used as a
private discovery tool. After the NLRB filed an unfair labor practice complaint against respondent employer, respondent requested,
pursuant to FOIA, that the Board make copies of all potential
witnesses' statements collected during the NLRB's investigation
available prior to the hearing. 84 This request was denied on the
ground that the statements were exempt from disclosure under exemption 7(A) of FOIA, which provides that disclosure is not re78. 410 U.S. at 84.
79. Id. at 106 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (quoting Act of June 5, 1967, Pub. L. No.
90-23, § 552(a)(3), 81 Stat. 54 (current version at 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1976))).
80. See Pub. L. No. 93-502, §§ 1-3, 88 Stat. 1561 (current version at 5 U.S.C. §
552 (1976)).

81.
82.
83.
84.

See id. § 2(a)(1)(B) (current version at 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)(B) (1976)).
See id. § 1(b)(2) (current version at 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (1976)).
437 U.S. 214 (1978).
Id. at 216.
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quired of "investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such records
would . . . interfere with enforcement proceedings." 85 The lower
court held that the NLRB had failed to sustain its burden of
demonstrating the availability of exemption 7(A) because it had introduced no evidence that interference with the unfair labor practice proceeding in the form of witness intimidation was likely to occur in this case. 86
The Supreme Court reversed, rejecting an interpretation of
exemption 7(A) under which determination of "interference" would
be made only on a case-by-case basis. The exemption language
does not prevent federal courts from determining that disclosure of
particular kinds of investigatory records while a case is pending
would " 'interfere with enforcement proceedings.' "87 In Robbins,
disclosure of the witnesses' statements "would interfere with enforcement proceedings" since the dangers posed by premature release of the statements would involve precisely the kind of interference with enforcement proceedings that exemption 7(A) was
designed to avoid. 88 In this case the perceived risk was that employers or unions would coerce or intimidate employees and others
who had given statements, in an effort to make them change their
testimony or not testify at all.8 9 The Court stressed that "[t]he basic purpose of FOIA is to ensure an informed citizenry, vital to the
functioning of a democratic society, needed to check against corruption and to hold the governors accountable to the governed."90
But it was not intended to overturn the NLRB's longstanding rule
against prehearing disclosure of statements by witnesses. A contrary rule would "have a chilling effect on the Board's sources." 91
The Court has also declined to go beyond FOIA's explicit language and interpret the statute as authorizing so-called "reverse
FOIA" suits. Under FOIA third parties have been able to obtain
governmental files containing information submitted by persons
who thought the information would be held in confidence. To protect their expectations from being frustrated by disclosure, they
brought "reverse FOIA" suits to enjoin the disclosure.
85.
86.

§ 2(b) (current version at 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(A) (1976)).
563 F.2d 724, 735-36 (5th Cir. f977), retd, 437 U.S. 214 (1978).

87. 437 U.S. at 236 (quoting Freedom of InformatiOn Act § 2(b) (current version
at 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(A) (1976))).
88. Id. at 239.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 242 (citations omitted).
91. Id. at 241 (footnote omitted).
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Chrysler Corp. v. Brown9 2 was such a "reverse FOIA" suit.
Petitioner was a governmental contractor who had been required
to furnish detailed employment data to the Department of Labor's
Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs (OFCCP). When
third parties made an FOTA request for disclosure, the contractor
sought to enjoin release of the documents, contending that FOIA
bars disclosure of the requested employment information. 9 3 The
Court rejected the contention. 94 Its unanimous decision was that
FOIA is exclusively a disclosure statute and affords no private right
of action to enjoin agency disclosure. The FOIA provisions exempting specified material from disclosure are meant only to permit agencies to withhold certain information, not to mandate
nondisclosure. FOIA protects the interest in confidentiality of persons submitting information only to the extent that this interest is
endorsed by the agency collecting the information. 95 FOIA ex
proprio vigore does not forbid agencies from disclosing any information to the public, and in this case the agency had issued regula96
tions that provided for public disclosure of the requested records.
Petitioner had also relied on the Trade Secrets Act, which specifically prohibits disclosure by governmental employees of certain
information submitted to agencies. 9 7 The Court rejected the Govemnment's claim 98 that the OFCCP regulations providing for disclosure brought the case within the Trade Secrets Act's exception for
disclosures "authorized by law." The case was remanded for determination of whether the contemplated disclosures would violate
the Trade Secrets Act. 9 9 This implies that while "reverse FOIA"
suits, as such, are not permitted, the ability to prevent disclosure
may be obtained under the Trade Secrets Act. Seeking review
under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)19° to determine
whether disclosure violates the Trade Secrets Act's prohibitions
will replace "reverse FOIA" suits as a technique to protect information furnished to agencies.

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

441 U.S. 281 (1979).
Brief for Petitioner at 33, Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281 (1979).
441 U.S. at 294.
Id. at 292-94.
See 41 C.F.R. §§ 60-1.3, 60-1.7 (1979).
Trade Secrets Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1976).
Brief for Respondents at 36, Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281 (1979).
441 U.S. at 318-19.
See Administrative Procedure Act § 3, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976).
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Investigatory Power
The decisions of the Burger Court make a logical corpus out of
the case law on one of the most significant administrative investigatory powers, the power of inspection. Prior to the Burger Court,
the leading cases on inspection power were Camara v. Municipal
Court'01 and See v. City of Seattle,'10 2 both of which were decided
in 1967. In Camara the Court ruled that the fourth 10 3 and fourteenth' °4 amendments prohibited an administrative inspection without a search warrant.' 0 5 In See the Court held that the protections
extended to business premises as well. 10 6 Three years later in Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States10 7 the Court implied that
Congress was not bound by the See holding in dealing with a
closely regulated industry, such as the liquor business. The legislature could validly provide for warrantless inspections of such businesses by the relevant regulatory agency,' 0 8 although in Colonnade
a divided Court held that Congress had not authorized warrantless
inspections in the governing statute.10 9
United States v. Biswell1 0 made explicit what had been implied in Colonnade. It held that a warrantless search of a locked
storeroom during business hours as part of an inspection authorized
by the Gun Control Act of 1968,111 which resulted in the seizure of
unlicensed firearms from a dealer federally licensed to deal in
sporting weapons, did not violate the fourth amendment. 1 12 Even
though federal regulation of traffic in firearms is not as longstanding as governmental control of the liquor industry, close scrutiny and frequent inspections are essential to enforce the law; these
would be frustrated by a warrant requirement. When a dealer
chooses to engage in this pervasively regulated business, he or she
does so with knowledge that he or she is subject to effective inspection. The Court explained a year after Biswell: "A central dif101.
102.
103.

387 U.S. 523 (1967).
387 U.S. 541 (1967).
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.

104. Id. amend. XIV.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

387 U.S. at 532-33.
387 U.S. at 543.
397 U.S. 72 (1970).
Id. at 76-77.
Id. at 77.
406 U.S. 311 (1972).
§ 902(g), 18 U.S.C. § 923(g) (1976).
406 U.S. at 317.
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ference between those cases [Colonnade and Biswell] is that businessmen engaged in such federally licensed and regulated
enterprises accept the burden as well as the benefits of their trade
... . The businessman in a regulated industry in effect consents to
the restrictions placed upon him."' 1 3
However, Colonnade and Biswell did not make clear the basis
for and extent of the warrantless inspection exception. Did it apply
to all regulated businesses or only to those subject to pervasive
regulation by an ICC-type regulatory agency? Did it turn on
whether the business operated under a license, so that implied
consent could be assumed? Could the legislature authorize warrantless inspections in every case where there was a direct public interest in effective enforcement of the agency's regulatory scheme?
These questions were answered in 1978 by Marshall v.
Barlow's, Inc. 11A That case arose out of an attempt by an Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) inspector to conduct a search
of an electrical and plumbing installation business. The inspector
acted under a statutory provision authorizing agents of the Secretary of Labor to enter and inspect the work area of any employment facility within OSHA's jurisdiction to search for safety hazards
and violations of OSHA regulations." 5 Admission was denied because the inspector did not have a search warrant. The business
sought injunctive relief against warrantless OSHA searches. The
Court held that the fourth amendment required a warrant for this
type of search; the statutory authorization for warrantless inspections was unconstitutional. 16
The Secretary of Labor had argued that the case came within
the Colonnade-Biswell exception. 17 Although the Court noted that
those cases were indeed exceptions, it stated that "they represent
responses to relatively unique circumstances. '" 8 Certain businesses have such a history of governmental regulation that there
can be no reasonable expectation of privacy by those engaged in
such businesses. Liquor and firearms are examples; "when an entrepreneur embarks upon such a business, he has voluntarily chosen to subject himself to a full arsenal of governmental regula113.

Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 271 (1973).

114.

436 U.S. 307 (1978).

115. Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, § 8(a), 29 U.S.C. § 657(a)
(1976).
116. 436 U.S. at 325.
117. Brief for Appellants at 25, Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978).
118. 436 U.S. at 313.
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tion." 119 Barlow's involvement in interstate commerce did not

make it subject to the same degree of close supervision; nor did
this imply constructive consent to inspections. Since few businesses
operate without having some effect on interstate commerce, a contrary approach would remove the fourth amendment requirement
and permit warrantless inspections of business premises. A
regulatory scheme that cuts across industry and imposes requirements in a given field for all businesses does not fall within the
warrantless inspection exception. For the exception to apply, the
business must be under the jurisdiction of an agency vested with
pervasive regulatory authority, including licensing power, over the
specific industry.
Barlow's stressed that the warrant requirement in cases not
within the Colonnade-Biswell exception did not include the same
120
showing of probable cause demanded in criminal law cases.
OSHA entitlement to inspect will not depend on demonstrating
probable cause to believe that conditions in violation of OSHA exist on the premises: A showing that a business has been chosen for
an OSHA inspection based on a general enforcement plan, considering such factors as the dispersion of employees in various types
of industries across a given area, and the desired frequency of
searches in any of the lesser divisions of the area, would adequately protect fourth amendment rights. 12 1 Presumably this would
allow traditional inspection tools, such as the "spot check" or random inspection, as well as area-by-area or industry-by-industry inspections.
The dissent in Barlow's urged that under the Court's diluted
probable cause standard the inspection warrant is a formality that
adds little in the way of protection. 12 2 This overlooks the dangers
of harassment inspections that are reduced by requiring a warrant.
The warrant provides assurance of independent scrutiny by a judicial officer. That assurance is lacking where the only check is
within the agency itself. The authority to make warrantless inspections confers almost unbridled discretion upon inspectors in the
field concerning when and whom to search.

119. Id.
120.

Id. at 320. For a discussion of the probable cause requirement in the crim-

inal context, see, e.g., United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 577 (1971); Spinelli v.
United States, 393 U.S. 410, 419 (1969); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 109 (1964).
121. 436 U.S. at 320-21.
122. Id. at 334 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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RULEMAKING

Legal Effect
In the perspective of American history, the most important
case decided by the Burger Court may well be United States v.
Nixon, 12 3 which led to Mr. Nixon's resignation from the nation's
highest office. The Nixon case also confirms a basic administrative
law principle: Administrative rules and regulations have the legal
effect of statutes. Nixon arose out of an action by the Special Prosecutor to enforce a subpoena directing the President to produce
tape recordings and documents. The President contended that "the
matter was an intra-branch dispute between a subordinate and superior officer of the Executive Branch and hence not subject to
judicial resolution.' 124 The contention was rejected because the Attorney General had issued regulations conferring on the Special
Prosecutor unique tenure and authority to represent the United
States and "explicit power to contest the invocation of executive
privilege in the process of seeking evidence .
"..."125The executive branch was bound by the regulation: "So long as this regulation is extant it has the force of law."' 12 6 Thus a regulation has the
same legal effect as a statute, and it is equally binding on the government and private citizens. The Court found that "as the sovereign composed of the three branches," the government "is bound
1 27
to-respect and to enforce [the regulation]."'
The Court itself appears to have ignored the basic principle affirmed in Nixon in the 1979 case of United States v. Caceres,128
involving tape recordings of monitored conversations. The Court
held that these recordings could be introduced into evidence even
though they had been recorded by IRS agents in violation of IRS
regulations requiring authorization prior to monitoring and recording. 1 29 According to the Court, "as a matter of administrative law
.. . it seems clear that agencies are not required, at the risk of invalidation of their action, to follow all of their rules, even those
properly classified as 'internal.' "130 In view of cases such as Nixon,
123.
124.
125.
Fed. Reg.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

418 U.S. 683 (1974).
Id. at 692.
Id. at 695 (footnote omitted) (citing 38 Fed. Reg. 30,739, as amended by 38
32,805 (1973)).
Id.
Id. at 696.
440 U.S. 741 (1979).
IRS, INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL 652.22 (1975).
440 U.S. at 754 n.18.
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such a statement is questionable, to say the least. The Court
stressed that the violated regulations were required neither by the
Constitution nor by statute. 131 But the cases are legion that hold
agencies to rules more generous than those demanded by the Constitution or by a statute.132 Justice Frankfurter endorsed this principle: "He that takes the procedural sword shall perish with that
sword.' 133 Agency violation of its own rules is considered arbitrary
action that "cannot be reconciled with the fundamental principle
that ours is a government of laws."' 1 34 It violates every sense of decency for the agency to abrogate a rule to accomplish the ends of a
particular case. 135 "What a farce the attempt to secure rights in any
judicial tribunal must become, if its rules and practice are ignored
or applied at the arbitrary will of the judge . . . !"136 The same is
true where an agency ignores its own rules and practice.
The principle that a rule or regulation has the force and effect
of law applies only where the rule or regulation meets certain criteria. One factor relates to the distinction between interpretive and
substantive rules. 1 3 7 A substantive rule, or a " 'legislative-type
rule,' " is one " 'affecting individual rights and obligations.' "138
For a substantive rule to come within the "force and effect of law'"
principle it must be rooted in a legislative delegation.
This important limitation was spelled out in Chrysler Corp. v.
Brown, 13 9 discussed above as a leading case under the Freedom of
Information Act. As seen, Chrysler disallowed a "reverse FOIA'"
action, and the Court ruled that FOIA does not afford a private
right of action to enjoin agency disclosure of information supplied
by petitioner. 140 Petitioner argued that its injunction suit could

131. Id. at 751-52.
132. E.g., Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 235 (1974); Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S.
535, 547 (1959) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Service v.
Dulles, 354 U.S. 363, 388 (1957); United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347
U.S. 260, 267 (1954).
133. Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535, 547 (1959) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
134. Hammond v. Lenfest, 398 F.2d 705, 715 (2d Cir. 1968).
135. See Colyer v. Skeffington, 265 F. 17, 48 (D. Mass. 1920) (argument by
Felix Frankfurter), rev'd sub nom. Skeffington v. Katzeff, 277 F. 129 (1st Cir. 1922).
136. Germania Iron Co. v. James, 89 F. 811, 818 (8th Cir. 1898).
137. See Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 301-02 (1979); B. SCHWARTZ,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAw § 58; id. § 59, at 155-57 (1976).
138. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. at 302 (quoting Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S.
199, 236 (1974)); id. at 232.

139. Id. at 285. See text accompanying notes 92-99 supra.
140. 441 U.S. at 292-94.
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also be premised on the Trade Secrets Act provision prohibiting
disclosure by governmental employees "in any manner or to any
extent not 'authorized by law'" of certain information submitted to
agencies. 141 The Government argued that the instant disclosure
was "authorized by law" because regulations' 42 of the Department
of Labor's Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs
(OFCCP) provide for public disclosure of information such as that
furnished by petitioner. 143 The Court rejected this argument, holding that only those regulations that are the product of a congressional grant of legislative authority can be "law" within the meaning of the Trade Secrets Act: 144 "'The legislative power of the
United States is vested in the Congress, and the exercise of quasilegislative authority by governmental departments and agencies
must be rooted in a grant of such power by the Congress and subject to limitations which that body imposes."' 145 The OFCCP regulations were promulgated under authority delegated not by statute
but by an Executive Order; 146 the OFCCP regulations were not
reasonably within the contemplation of any statutory grants of authority, either to the President or to the Department of Labor. Absent an identifiable delegation, "the thread between these regulations and any grant of authority by the Congress is so strained that
it would do violence to established principles of separation of powers
to denominate these particular regulations 'legislative' and credit
them with the 'binding effect of law.' "'147
Procedure
As discussed above, the Burger Court has refused to go beyond statutory language and recognize implied powers of agencies
that were not specifically conferred by Congress. The Court's tendency to confine itself to the literal language of statutes is also apparent in its decisions on the provisions of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act governing rulemaking procedure. 148 But this
141. Brief for Petitioner at 40, Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281 (1979)
(quoting Trade Secrets Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1976)).
142. See 41 C.F.R. §§ 60-40.2 to 60-40.4 (1979).
143. Brief for Respondent at 36, Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281 (1979).

144. 441 U.S. at 315-16.
145. Id. at 302.
146. Exec. Order No. 11,246, 30 Fed. Reg. 12,319 (1965), as amended by Exec.
Order No. 11,375, 32 Fed. Reg. 14,303 (1967).
147. 441 U.S. at 307-08.
148. Administrative Procedure Act §§ 4-5, 7-8, 5 U.S.C. §§ 553-554, 556-557
(1976).
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time the result has favored agency authority: The decisions on
rulemaking procedure leave the details up to the agencies concerned, subject only to the requirements imposed by the literal
language of the APA.
Under the APA "notice and comment" system of rulemaking
procedure, the APA mandates only that the agency publish notice
of proposed rulemaking in the Federal Register and give interested
persons some opportunity to comment on the proposed regulations. 149 This system has been criticized as providing insufficient
procedural safeguards, particularly in the newer fields of environmental and nuclear regulation, which involve complex scientific
and technical issues. 1 50 The factual issues in those fields have been
deemed inappropriate for trial-type procedures; instead issues have
been resolved in rulemaking proceedings. Some courts, however,
have been unwilling to allow the agencies to limit themselves to
the informal procedural requirements imposed by the APA.' 5 '
Some proceedings involve factual components of such importance
that a greater assurance of accuracy is required than that which
accompanies ordinary rulemaking procedures: "[M]ore precision
may be required than the less rigorous development of scientific
facts which may attend notice and comment procedures.'1 52 The
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, in particular,
handed down a series of decisions holding that, in those rulemaking cases involving complicated scientific issues, procedures in
53
excess of the minima prescribed by the APA may be required.
The Supreme Court aborted this line of cases in Vermont Yan149. Id. § 4(b)-(c), 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)-(c).
150.

See Hamilton, Procedures for the Adoption of Rules of General Applica-

bility: The Need for ProceduralInnovation in Administrative Rulemaking, 60 CALIF.
L. REV. 1276, 1315 (1972).
151. E.g., Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. United States Nuclear
Regulatory Comm'n, 547 F.2d 633, 643 (D.C. Cir. 1976), rev'd sub nom. Vermont
Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S.
519 (1978); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 483 F.2d 1238, 1260 (D.C.
Cir. 1973); International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 629-31 (D.C.
Cir. 1973); Walter Holm & Co. v. Hardin, 449 F.2d 1009, 1016 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
152. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 547 F.2d 633, 657 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (Bazelon, C.J., separate statement),
rev'd sub nom. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
153. See, e.g., id. at 643; Mobil Oil Corp. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 483 F.2d
1238, 1260 (D.C. Cir. 1973); International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d
615, 629-31 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Walter Holm & Co. v. Hardin, 449 F.2d 1009, 1016
(D.C. Cir. 1971).
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kee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc. 154 The District of Columbia Court of Appeals had struck down
a rule of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission dealing with the uranium fuel cycle in nuclear power reactors1 5 5 because of procedural
inadequacies in the rulemaking proceedings. 1 56 The agency had
complied with the APA notice and comment requirements, but the
court of appeals held that more was required to ensure that the issues were ventilated fully. In particular, the court accepted the argument of the public interest intervenors that the agency's decision
to preclude discovery or cross-examination denied a meaningful
opportunity to the environmental associations that had sought to
participate in the proceeding. 1 57 The Supreme Court reversed,
holding that the APA lays down the only procedural requirements for informal rulemaking. To require more "almost compels
the agency to conduct all rulemaking proceedings with the full panoply of procedural8 devices normally associated only with adjudi15
catory hearings."'
The Supreme Court has recently explained that Vermont Yankee "held that courts could only in 'extraordinary circumstances'
impose procedural requirements on an agency beyond those
specified in the APA. It is within an agency's discretion to afford
parties more procedure, but it is not the province of the courts to
do so."'1 59 This means that if agencies are going to be required to
follow stricter procedures than those imposed by the APA, the requirements must be imposed by Congress, not by the courts.
It is undesirable for the APA to be amended to require more
than notice and comment procedures in most rulemaking proceedings. Recent years have seen a tremendous expansion of rulemaking powers. Both Congress and the courts have fostered this trend.
But that does not mean that rulemaking should be conformed to
the judicial process; that would defeat the principal advantages of
the rulemaking process. As a member of the court of appeals in
Vermont Yankee concedes, "requiring cross-examination in a rule154. 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
155. 39 Fed. Reg. 14,188, 14,191 (1974) (current version at 10 C.F.R.

§

51.20

(1979)).
156. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. United States Nuclear Regula-

tory Comm'n, 547 F.2d 633, 653 (D.C. Cir. 1976), rev'd sub nom. Vermont Yankee
Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519
(1978).

157. Id. at 643.
158. 435 U.S. at 547.
159. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 312-13 (1979).
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making proceeding is radical therapy, which may cause the patient to suffer a slow, painful death." 160 The Supreme Court recognizes that agencies are free to grant additional procedural rights in
rulemaking; "but reviewing courts are generally not free to impose
16 1
them if the agencies have not chosen to grant them."
Formal Rulemaking
The Burger Court has also adopted a restrictive approach to
the APA provisions for formal rulemaking,1 62 refusing to go beyond
a narrow and literal approach to the relevant APA language.
Formal rulemaking requires a "trial-type" hearing, in accordance
with the APA requirements for adjudicatory procedures. 163 The
APA mandates such a hearing "[w]hen rules are required by statute to be made on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing."' 164 The APA requires most of the procedural formalities that
are found in adjudication, including the right to submit evidence
and to cross-examine. 16 5 The approach is a hybrid one that imposes
adjudication requirements upon a rulemaking proceeding.
In United States v. Florida East Coast Railway, 16 6 the Court
held that formal rulemaking is required under the APA only
where the enabling legislation expressly provides for the rules to
be made " 'on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing.' "167 Whatever Congress may have meant by a phrase Judge
Friendly has termed reminiscent of certiorari by the seventeenth
century King's Bench, 168 the Court held that Congress clearly intended to hold the agency to APA formal adjudicatory procedures
only when the agency was otherwise required to hold a "trial-type"
hearing before issuing the rules. Statutory language authorizing the
agency to act "after hearing" is not the equivalent of a requirement
that a rule be made "on the record after opportunity for an agency
hearing." In a 1972 case the Court had implied that something less
160.
161.
162.
(1976).
163.

547 F.2d at 655 (Bazelon, C.J., separate statement).
435 U.S. at 524.
See Administrative Procedure Act §§ 5, 7-8, 5 U.S.C. §§ 554, 556-557
See id.

164. Id. § 4(c), 5 U.S.C. § 553(c); id. § 5(a), 5 U.S.C. § 554(a) (1976).
165. See id. §§ 5, 7-8, 5 U.S.C. §§ 554, 556-557 (1976).
166. 410 U.S. 224 (1973).
167. Id. at 237 (construing Administrative Procedure Act § 4(c), 5 U.S.C. §
553(c) (1976)).
168. Long Island R.R. v. United States, 318 F. Supp. 490, 496 (E.D.N.Y. 1970)
(Friendly, C.J.).
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than the precise words "on the record" might suffice for formal
rulemaking to be required. 16 9 Florida East Coast virtually established those words as a touchstone test of when compliance with
the APA adjudicatory procedure sections was demanded. Unless a
statute expressly demands that rules be based "on the record" of a
required hearing, the agency need follow only the notice and comment rulemaking procedures specified in the APA.
Rulemaking Versus Adjudication
The problem in this area involves retroactive lawmaking by
adjudication. In exercising adjudicatory power, an agency, like a
court, must frequently decide cases on the basis of new doctrines.
The retroactive effect in lawmaking by adjudication may prove unfair to the parties. A court, which has the power to decide only
contested cases, may find it difficult to avoid such unfairness. But
the agency has another instrument at its disposal: It can lay down
the new law by rulemaking and thereby give fair notice in advance.
Should it be legally required to do so? In the now-famous second
Chenery case," 70 the Court answered that question in the negative:
An agency is not barred from applying a new principle in an
adjudicatory proceeding simply because it had the power to announce that principle in advance by using its power of rulemaking. 171
Chenery has been criticized as unfair in cases where adjudications are used to accomplish marked policy departures.' 72 Justice
Harlan noted that this may occur where the new policy revolutionizes long-established patterns of conduct and those affected have
justifiably relied upon an agency-engendered belief in an established policy. i 73 Even in such cases, however, the Burger Court
has adhered to the Chenery principle. The Court reaffirmed its position by its unanimous reversal of the second circuit decision in
NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co. 17 4 The court of appeals had refused to
enforce an NLRB bargaining order,7 5 finding that the Board had
169. United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Steel Corp., 406 U.S. 742, 757 (1972).
170. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947).
171. Id. at 201-02.
172. See Nathanson, Administrative Discretion in the Interpretation of Statutes, 3 VAND. L. REV. 470, 489-90 (1950); Note, Ad Hoc Action by Administrative
Agencies, 2 ARK. L. REv. 439, 447 (1948); 23 N.Y.U. L.Q. 329, 330 (1948).
173. NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 781 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
174. 416 U.S. 267 (1974), rev'g 475 F.2d 485 (2d Cir. 1973).
175. Bell Aerospace, Inc., 197 N.L.R.B. 209 (1972).
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made such a significant change in its previous definition of types of
workers protected by the National Labor Relations Act 1 76 that
rulemaking rather than adjudication was required. 1 77 The Supreme
Court reversed, holding that even in cases involving marked policy
departures, agencies are not precluded from announcing new principles in an adjudicative proceeding; the choice between rulemaking and adjudication still lies within the agency's discretion.
The Board can decide to proceed with caution, developing its
standards in a case-by-case manner rather than through a general178
ized rule.
Bell Aerospace may be criticized as failing to distinguish between the proper spheres of legislative and judicial power. Use of
rulemaking to make innovations in agency policy may be fairer
than relying on case-by-case adjudications. 1 79 Rulemaking provides
the agency with a forum that maximizes the degree of participation
by affected interests. Adjudication limits participation to the parties
in the particular case. It may be said that Bell Aerospace is consistent with the present Court's tendency to refuse to go beyond the
statutory language in interpreting agency powers. Since Congress
has vested agencies with both rulemaking and adjudicatory powers
and has not specified when either type of authority is appropriate,
the judiciary may not impose such limits. Here, too, the Court is
unwilling to fill in possible statutory lacunae.
RIGHT TO BE HEARD

Legislative Versus Judicial Functions
In United States v. Florida East Coast Railway,'8 0 the Court
expressly confirmed that the "recognized distinction in administrative law between proceedings for the purpose of promulgating
policy-type rules or standards, on the one hand, and proceedings
designed to adjudicate disputed facts in particular cases on the
other" determines the due process right to be accorded. 18 ' In so
doing the Court reaffirmed the validity of the two classic cases in

176. §§ 1, 2(3), 2(11), 7, 8(a)(1), 8(a)(5), 9(b), 29 U.S.C. §§ 151, 152(3), 152(11),
157, 158(a)(1), 158(a)(5), 159(b) (1976).
177. 475 F.2d 485, 495-96 (2d Cir. 1973), rev'd, 416 U.S. 267 (1974).
178. 416 U.S. at 294.
179. See National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672, 681 (D.C.

Cir. 1973).
180.

410 U.S. 224 (1973). See text accompanying notes 166-169 supra.

181.

410 U.S. at 245.
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the area, Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. State Board of Equalization 8 2 and Londoner v. City of Denver,'8 3 saying that "[t]he basic
distinction between rulemaking and adjudication is illustrated by
this Court's treatment of [those] two related cases under the Due
Process Clause."'8
Professor Nathanson has criticized the different results in BiMetallic and Londoner..8 5 He finds Justice Holmes' explanation of
the difference unconvincing, and has also criticized the Florida
East Coast approval of the Holmes approach. According to
Nathanson, the question before the agency in Bi-Metallie-whether
the assessed valuation of all property in Denver should be increased by forty percent- "seems to present a factual issue eminently suitable for resolution either in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings by examination of the data, or examination of witnesses
familiar with the data, or both." 8 6 One wonders whether the
Nathanson criticism is fair to either Justice Holmes or the Florida
East Coast opinion. It may be doubted whether a trial-type proceeding would have been appropriate to resolve the Bi-Metallic
factual issues. It is hard to see how evidence and arguments
relating to plaintiff's particular property would be relevant to the
agency's decision whether to increase the valuation of all property
in Denver. In Londoner, however, where the question was
"'whether, in what amount, and upon whom' a tax for
paving a
street should be levied for special benefits,"' 8 7 a trial would be appropriate for presentation of evidence and argument concerning
plaintiff's individual facts in relation to those of his neighbors.
Be that as it may, the present Court has expressly confirmed
the traditional rulemaking-adjudication distinction adopted in BiMetallic and Londoner.118 In Florida East Coast the Court applied the distinction to reject a claim' 8 9 that there was a right to a
182. 239 U.S. 441 (1915).
183. 210 U.S. 373 (1908).
184. 410 U.S. at 244; accord, Alaska Airlines v. CAB, 545 F.2d 194, 200 (D.C.

Cir. 1976).
185. Nathanson, Probing the Mind of the Administrator Hearing Variations
and Standards of Judicial Review under the Administrative Procedure Act and
Other Federal Statutes, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 721 (1975).
186. Id. at 725.

187. 210 U.S. at 385, quoted in Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. State Board of
Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445-46 (1915).
188. Other courts have followed this distinction as well. See San Diego Bldg.
Contractors Ass'n v. City Council, 13 Cal. 3d 205, 211-15, 529 P.2d 570, 573-76, 118
Cal. Rptr. 146, 149-52 (1974), appeal dismissed, 427 U.S. 901 (1976).
189. Brief for Appellee at 38, United States v. Florida E. Coast Ry., 410 U.S.
224 (1973).
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trial-type hearing before the ICC issued an order 90 establishing
incentive per diem rates for use by one railroad of freight cars
owned by another. 19 1 The ICC had acted in a rulemaking proceeding, following only the informal APA procedures, even though the
Interstate Commerce Act required the Commission to act "after
notice and an opportunity for a hearing."' 192 The Court upheld the
Commission's actions and rejected the claim that because
ratemaking was involved there had to be a full trial-type hearing.
The term "hearing" was used in the Act in the context of a
rulemaking-type proceeding, not in the context of a proceeding devoted to the adjudication of particular disputed facts. The railroads
had relied on the second Morgan case; 1 93 the Court distinguished
Morgan on the ground that the proceedings there had been characterized as "quasi-judicial" and thus presumably distinct from the
rulemaking proceeding in Florida East Coast.194 Yet Morgan involved comparable ratemaking with a similar statutory requirement. Chief Justice Hughes had described these proceedings as
"quasi-judicial" only because the statute was interpreted as
requiring a full adjudicatory hearing.1 95 The Court's attempt to distinguish Morgan is largely irrelevant and constitutes a gratuitous
watering down of a decision long considered a landmark in administrative procedure.
If Florida East Coast is to be supported on its merits, one
must analogize to the rule governing a Federal Power Commission
(FPC)1 96 area rate order. When the FPC engages in traditional
ratemaking by fixing the rates to be charged by an individual gas
producer, it must give the producer an opportunity to be heard in
a trial-type hearing. 197 But when the Commission decided to fix
gas rates upon an area basis, fixing the rate of sales in the entire
Rocky Mountain area, it was permitted to proceed through APA
190. Incentive Per Diem Charges-1968, Ex Parte No. 252 (Sub-No. 1), 337
I.C.C. 217 (1970).
191. 410 U.S. at 244-46.
192. Interstate Commerce Act § 1(14)(a), 49 U.S.C. § 1(14)(a) (1976).
193. Brief for Appellee, supra note 189, at 39-40 (citing Morgan v. United
States, 304 U.S. 1 (1938) (rate order set by Sec'y of Agriculture void for failure to al-

low full hearing)).
194.

410 U.S. at 245-46.

195. Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1938).
196. Now the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. Department of Energy
Organization Act, Pub. L. No. 95-91, §§ 401(a), 402(a), 91 Stat. 565 (1977) (codified
in 42 U.S.C. §§ 7171(a), 7172(a) (Supp. I 1977)).
197. See Natural Gas Act of 1938, § 5(a), 15 U.S.C. § 717 (1976). See, e.g., Federal Power Comm'n v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575, 583-84 (1942).
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rulemaking and forego an evidentiary hearing. 19 8 This was permissible because the FPC had moved from particularized ratemaking
to a group or class proceeding in which the separate fact pattern of
each member of the class was not evaluated. 19 9 The same is true of
the ICC rate order in FloridaEast Coast:
Here, the incentive payments proposed by the Commission
in its tentative order, and later adopted in its final order, were
applicable across the board to all of the common carriers by railroad subject to the Interstate Commerce Act. No effort was
made to single out any particular railroad for special consideration based on its own peculiar circumstances .... [T]he fact that
the order may in its effects have been thought more disadvantageous by some railroads than by others does not change its
generalized nature. Though the Commission obviously relied on
factual inferences as a basis for its for order, the source of these
factual inferences was apparent to anyone who read the order of
December 1969. The factual inferences were used in formulation of a basically legislative-type judgment, for prospective
application only, rather than in adjudicating a particular set of
disputed facts. 20 0
Due Process Explosion
The Burger Court's decision in Goldberg v. Kelly 20 1 triggered
what Judge Friendly terms the "due process explosion." 20 2 Goldberg marked a culmination in the movement from the traditional
concept of governmental benefits as mere "privileges" not entitled
to procedural due process protection. The Supreme Court held
"that due process requires an adequate hearing before termination
of welfare benefits." 203 It was no answer to the due process claim to
argue that welfare benefits were a "privilege" and not a "right." "It
may be realistic today to regard welfare entitlements as more like
'property' than a 'gratuity,' " since "such benefits are a matter of
statutory entitlement for persons qualified to receive them."2 0 4
Public assistance "is not mere charity . . . . The same governmental interests that counsel the provision of welfare, counsel as well
198.
(10th Cir.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.

See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 475 F.2d 842, 852
1973).
Id. at 849-50.
410 U.S. at 245-46.
397 U.S. 254 (1970).
Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1267, 1268 (1975).
397 U.S. at 261.
Id. at 262, 262 n.8.
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its uninterrupted provision to those eligible to receive it; pre20 5
termination evidentiary hearings are indispensable to that end."
As the Court recently conceded, its post-Goldberg decisions
"do not form a checkerboard of bright lines between black squares
and red squares, neither do they leave courts, and parties litigating
federal constitutional claims in them, quite . . . at sea." 20 6 However, the Court's decisions do "supply an analytical framework for
determining whether the Fourteenth Amendment rights of a person ... have been violated." 20 7 .
The first question is what interests are protected by procedural due process. When a denial of due process is claimed, the
courts must inquire into the nature of the individual's interest. According to the Court's 1979 decision in Greenholtz v. Inmates of
the Nebraska Penal Complex,20 8 the test to determine whether a
person has a protected right is not whether the person has a need,
desire, or even a unilateral expectation of it, but whether he or she
20 9
has "a legitimate claim of entitlement to it."
Goldberg and its progeny at first advanced the frontiers of due
process so rapidly that it seemed there might be no stopping
place. 210 Goldberg's holding that there was a right to be heard was
extended en masse to all the newer areas of administrative power,
2 13 education, 2 14
including welfare, 2 11 disability, 2 12 unemployment,
and housing. 2 15 In these areas due process was held to require a
full adversary hearing governed by the adjudicatory requirements
of the APA. Perhaps the culmination of the post-Golberg due process expansion was the decision in Goss v. Lopez, 21 6 where the
right to be heard was extended to school suspension cases, even
2 17
those involving suspensions of less than ten days.
However, if the Goldberg v. Kelly revolution reached its apogee in Goss v. Lopez, it may have met its thermidor in Mathews v.

205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.

Id. at 265.
Harrah Independent School Dist. v. Martin, 440 U.S. 194, 197 (1979).
Id.
442 U.S. 1 (1979).
Id. at 7 (quoting Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972)).
See generally Friendly, supra note 202, at 1316-17.
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S.-254 (1970).
Richardson v. Wright, 405 U.S. 208 (1972).
California Human Resources Dep't v. Java, 402 U.S. 121 (1971).
Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
Escalera v. New York City Hous. Auth., 425 F.2d 853 (2d Cir. 1970).
419 U.S. 565 (1975).
Id. at 575-76.
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Eldridge.2 18 The issue was whether due process required that the
recipient of social security disability payments be afforded an opportunity for an evidentiary hearing prior to termination of those
benefits. The statute 219 and regulations 2 20 provided that after an
initial determination by the Social Security Administration (SSA)
terminating payments, the recipient could seek reconsideration and
then an evidentiary hearing before an SSA administrative law
judge. Payments were terminated after the initial determination,
but if the recipient prevailed at the reconsideration, hearing, or a
later agency appeal, he or she would be entitled to retroactive payments. The lower courts ruled that the "interest of the disability
recipient in uninterrupted benefits [was] indistinguishable from
that of the welfare recipient in Goldberg" and held that due process required a pretermination hearing. 22 1 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that due process was satisfied by the posttermination procedures provided by the agency. 2 22 In Goldberg the Court
stressed that wefare benefits involved the " 'brutal need' "223 of
persons on the very margin of subsistence, where termination
"may deprive an eligible recipient of the very means by
which to
live while he waits." 224 In contrast, eligibility for disability benefits
was not based upon financial need. 2 25
Eldridge appears inconsistent with Goss, which held that
school pupils must be afforded presuspension hearings. The Court
in Eldridge noted that Goldberg illustrates how "the degree of potential deprivation that may be created by a particular decision is a
factor to be considered in assessing the validity of any administrative decisionmaking process."2 2 6 If that is determinative, who suffers the greater deprivation: the pupil subject to a short suspension
or the disabled worker whose disability payments are ended?
There is, of course, a basic difference: Eldridge involved monetary benefits, and retroactive back payments can theoretically re218. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
219. Social Security Act § 205, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)-(h) (1976).
220. 31 Fed. Reg. 16,765, 16,766 (1966) (current version at 20 C.F.R. §§
404.902, 404.905, 404.917 (1979)).
221. Eldridge v. Weinberger, 361 F. Supp. 520, 523 (W.D. Va. 1973), aff'd per
curiam, 493 F.2d 1230 (4th Cir. 1974), rev'd, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
222. 424 U.S. at 349.
223. 397 U.S. at 261 (quoting Kelly v. Wyman, 294 F. Supp. 893, 900 (S.D.N.Y.

1968)).
224. Id. at 264 (emphasis omitted).
225. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 340.
226. Id. at 341 (citation omitted).
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store the recipient to his or her pretermination position. In Goss,
however, the effects of the suspension could not be so readily undone. If that is the key factor, does it mean that Goldberg now
stands alone and that, if a posttermination hearing is enough in disability cases, the same is true in other monetary benefit cases other
than welfare cases? Eldridge may permit summary action in nonemergency cases, where deprivation of the monetary entitlement
occurs immediately, even though the posttermination hearing and
decision may not occur for a long time. As the Eldridge opinion
concedes, in the disability case this period may be longer than one
22 7
year.
In short, although Goldbergv. Kelly will probably continue to be
followed, its effect will be confined to the welfare termination case.
In cases involving other types of monetary largess, Mathews v.
Eldridge will set the procedural theme. This does not mean that
there will be no due process protection, but only that a pretermination hearing is not necessary. The right to a posttermination
hearing was reaffirmed in Eldridge, in which the Court stressed
the claimant's right to an evidentiary hearing and administrative review of the decision terminating his or her disability benefits.
Waiver and Exceptions
Administrative lawyers tend to speak of the "right to be
heard," which may be guaranteed by due process and/or by statute. However, it is more accurate to speak of the right to an opportunity to be heard. Like other rights, the right to be heard can
be waived. It is widespread waiver of that right that makes the
administrative process workable in practice, and the vast bulk of
agency decisions are made without resort to formal proceedings.
This point is illustrated in National Independent Coal Operators' Association v. Kleppe.228 At issue was the enforcement
scheme of the Coal Mine Health and Safety Act, which authorized
the Secretary of the Interior to assess penalties based upon notices
of violation issued by mine inspectors. 2 2 9 The operators were to be
advised that they had fifteen days to protest the proposed assessment and to request a formal hearing. If an operator failed to make
timely protest, he or she was deemed to have waived the right to a
227. Id. at 342.
228. 423 U.S. 388 (1976).
229. Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, § 109(a)(3), 30 U.S.C. §
819(a)(3) (1976).
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hearing. The Court upheld this procedure. 230 The statute provided
only "an opportunity" for a hearing; it did not require formal adjudication when a hearing was waived. A formal decision with findings is not required unless the mine operator exercises the right to
request a hearing.
The Coal Operators case also illustrates the application of the
principle of United States v. Illinois Central Railroad,2 3 1 which
permitted provisional agency action subject to the right to request
a hearing after the provisional order is issued. 2 32 Due process does
not establish "a Procrustean rule of a prior adversary hearing"; 233
the right to be heard is not a right to be heard at any particular
point in the agency's process. 23 4 The opportunity to be heard may
be given after the agency provisionally acts; "[w]here only property
rights are involved, mere postponement of the [opportunity to be
2 35
heard] is not a denial of due process."
As a general proposition, hearings are not required when no
disputed issues are raised. In Codd v. Velger, 2 36 a probationary police officer had been dismissed without a hearing. The dismissal
had been based upon a report that the officer had put a revolver to
his head in an apparent suicide attempt. Respondent claimed that
he was entitled to a hearing before dismissal because of the
stigmatizing effect of the material on the suicide attempt in his personnel file. 23 7 The Court rejected the claim. Even assuming the
elements necessary to make out a claim of stigmatization, due process mandates only an opportunity to refute the charge; the purpose
of a hearing is to provide an opportunity to clear one's name. But if
the due process clause is to serve any useful purpose, there must
be some factual dispute that has a significant bearing on the employee's reputation. Here respondent had not asserted that the report of the apparent suicide attempt was substantially false. The
absence of any such allegation was fatal to the officer's claim, since
his failure to dispute the report indicated that he was not harmed
2 38
by the denial of a hearing.
230.
231.
232.

423 U.S. at 398-99.
291 U.S. 457 (1934).
Id. at 464.

233. Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 628 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring).

234.
126, 152
235.
236.
237.

Opp Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Administrator of the Wage & Hour Div., 312 U.S.
(1941).
Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589, 596-97 (1931).
429 U.S. 624 (1977) (per curiam).
Brief for Respondent at 19-21, Codd v. Velger, 429 U.S. 624 (1977) (per

curiam).
238. 429 U.S. at 627.
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There are also emergency situations that justify summary action. One example is the tax collection case where "in view of the
necessity of the collection of the revenues to sustain the Government. . . the taxing authorities may lawfully seize a citizen's property in payment of taxes, prior to the opportunity for any adjudication of his liability." 239 This exception to the right to be heard has
been criticized as inconsistent with expanding due process concepts. 240 But the Burger Court has gone out of its way to reaffirm
the governmental power to collect taxes by summary administrative
proceedings; as long as there is adequate opportunity for a postseizure determination of the taxpayer's rights, the requirements of
due process are met.2 4 1 The Court has restated the traditional rationale for the tax cases: "[T]he very existence of government
depends upon the prompt collection of the revenues." 2 4 Even Justice Brennan, the member of the present Court most solicitousof
procedural rights, has indicated that seizure of a taxpayer's assets
upon a finding by the Commissioner absent a preseizure hearing is
valid: "Seizures pursuant to jeopardy assessments are clearly necessary to protect important governmental interests and there is a
'special need for very prompt action.' "243 Nevertheless, one may
wonder whether the tax cases should validly be treated as a wholesale exception to the right to be heard. Increasingly they appear as
an outmoded relic of an earlier day when the quaint notion persisted that, without tax revenue, the wheels of government would
stop.
Another exception to the due process right to be heard is set
forth in Board of Curatorsv. Horowitz.2 4 A student challenged her
dismissal from the medical school of a state university, alleging that
the university had not accorded her procedural due process prior
to her dismissal. The dismissal had been based upon faculty dissatisfaction with respondent's clinical performance. The Council
on Evaluation, which assessed academic performance, had recommended her dismissal. As an "appeal" of that decision, respondent
was permitted to take examinations under seven physicians. Only
two of them recommended her graduation. The Council then reaf239.
240.

Parrish v. Daly, 350 F. Supp. 735, 737 (S.D. Ind. 1972).
See, e.g., Freedman, Summary Action by Administrative Agencies, 40 U.

Cm.L. REv. 1, 13-14 (1972).
241. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Shapiro, 424 U.S. 614, 630-33 (1976); Phillips v.
Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589, 596-97 (1931).
242. G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338, 352 n.18 (1977).
243. Laing v. United States, 423 U.S. 161, 187 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring).
244. 435 U.S. 78 (1978).
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firmed its decision. The recommendation was approved by the faculty coordinating committee and dean and sustained, on appeal, by

the provost. 245
The Court rejected respondent's due process claim, dismissing
the argument that a different result was compelled by Goss v.
Lopez, 2 46 which mandated a hearing before students were suspended from public schools for disciplinary reasons. There are differences between disciplinary actions and actions "taken for academic reasons which may call for hearings in connection with the
former but not the latter." 2 47 Academic evaluations bear little resemblance to the factfinding proceedings involved in disciplinary
determinations, to which the hearing requirement has traditionally
been attached. 2 48 A decision that rests on academic judgments is
"more subjective and evaluative than the typical factual questions
presented in the average disciplinary decision."2 49 The determination to dismiss for academic reasons is comparable to deciding the
proper grade for a student in a course; it "requires an expert evaluation of cumulative information and is not readily adapted to
the procedural tools of judicial or administrative decisionmaking." 2 50 Under these circumstances, the Court declined to ignore
the historic deference to the judgment of educators and formalize
the academic dismissal process by requiring a hearing. "A school
[must remain] an academic institution, not a courtroom or an
administrative hearing room." 2 51
In more traditional terms, Horowitz is justified by the "pure
administrative process" exception to the due process right to be
heard: "cases where decisions are made on the basis of observation
by technical experts or objective tests." 252 A trial-type proceeding
is inappropriate when the decision is based upon evaluation of the
skill or competence of an individual. A test of the individual's competence is needed, and in an academic setting evaluation of performance by the appropriate educational authorities is all that is required.
It is elementary that there is a due process right to be heard
only when "life, liberty, or property" are adversely affected by gov245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.

Id. at 80-82.
419 U.S. 565 (1975).
435 U.S. at 87.
Id. at 89.
Id. at 90.
Id.
Id. at 88.

252. B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 137, § 69, at 196.
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ernmental action. As a general proposition, due process furnishes
no protection against private summary action: The state, not the
private individual, is the addressee of the due process clause.
Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co. 253 all but aborted a prior trend
toward what may be termed "corporate due process." 25" There the
Court held that due process restraints do not extend to privately
owned utilities. Hence, termination of electric service without notice and hearing did not violate due process.2 55 That the utility
was subject to pervasive state regulation did "not by itself convert
its action into that of the State for purposes of the fourteenth
256
amendment."
Though Jackson cut short a trend toward extending due process requirements to corporate action, the underlying problem remains. Constitutional limitations were designed to shelter us from
the rapacities, cruelties, and compulsion of governmental power.
We may now need similar protection from neo-statist corporate concentrations of economic power. On the other side is the
question of the suitability of administrative procedures in nongovernmental operations. Are procedures that have proved so cumbersome in regulatory administration the proper model for decisionmaking in the area of corporate activity?
PROCEDURAL PROBLEMS

Procedure Versus Due Process
A law professor cannot but feel grateful to the present Court
for emphasizing a point on which law students, and even lawyers
and judges, are too often unclear. There is a common tendency to
confuse nonconstitutional procedural rights with due process procedural rights. The Supreme Court itself has not been immune from
this imprecision.2 57 In the already-discussed case of Board of Curators v. Horowitz, 258 however, the Court was careful to stress the
distinction between due process and other procedural rights. The
student in Horowitz contended that the university had failed to follow its own rules respecting evaluation of medical students and
253. 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
254. See B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 137, § 87, at 246.

255. A different result is reached where the utility is publicly owned. See, e.g.,
Memphis
256.
257.
258.

Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1 (1978).
419 U.S. at 350.
See, e.g., Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 49 (1950).
435 U.S. 78 (1978). See text accompanying notes 244-252 supra.
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that this failure amounted to a constitutional violation. 25 9 The
Court disagreed with both the factual and legal contentions. The
facts showed that the medical school had followed its established
rules. Respondent's legal contention was also erroneous: The cases
laying down the basic principle that an agency must follow its own
procedural rules "enunciate principles of federal administrative law
rather than of constitutional law binding upon the States." 260 This
issue is one of practical as well as semantic significance. To elevate
a procedural right to the due process plane would make it binding
on the states under the fourteenth amendment.
Social Security Procedure
Next to Goldberg v. Kelly 2 61 the most important case on ad-

ministrative procedure decided by the Burger Court is Richardson
v. Perales.262 Perhaps the most difficult procedural problem in our
administrative law is adapting the formal adversary procedures that
have been developed in regulatory agencies to the newer areas of
benefactory administration, where the weight of numbers alone
makes it all but impossible to give each individual the full trial to
which he or she would be entitled under traditional administrative
law principles.
This was the underlying problem in Perales. At issue were the
procedures followed in Social Security Administration disability
cases, which depart significantly from the adjudicatory pattern customarily followed by administrative agencies. 263 The SSA in operation is perhaps the best example of the need for assembly-line justice that still retains the essentials of fair procedure. A two-stage
screening process disposes of the vast majority of cases without a
hearing. 264 At the hearing stage itself, the SSA has developed its
own procedures, which differ in several important respects from
those of other agencies. The hearing officer in an SSA proceeding
presents the case for the Government, develops the case for the
claimant unless claimant is represented by counsel, and then
makes the initial decision. 265
259.

Brief for Respondent at 42-46, Board of Curators v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78

(1978).
260.
261.
262.

435 U.S. at 92 n.8 (citations omitted).
397 U.S. 254 (1970). See text accompanying notes 201-217 supra.
402 U.S. 389 (1971).

263. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.927 (1979).
264. See 402 U.S. at 392-94.
265. See Rausch v. Gardner, 267 F. Supp. 4, 6 (E.D. Wis. 1967).
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In Perales, the Court rejected an attack on these multiple
functions of the SSA examiner:26 6 "[W]e [are not] persuaded by
the advocate-judge-multiple-hat suggestion. It assumes too much
and would bring down too many procedures designed, and working
well, for a governmental structure of great and growing complexity." 2 67 The examiner does not act as counsel, but as an examiner
charged with developing the facts. While at first glance the SSA
hearing sounds like an American version of inquisitorial procedure
it seems to work fairly and represents a reasonable adaptation in an
agency that must cope with a staggering caseload.
Also at issue in Perales was another aspect of the SSA hearing
procedure that departs from the traditional adjudicatory pattern.
Perales had filed for disability benefits, claiming that a back injury
had disabled him. After his claim was disapproved, he requested
and was granted a hearing. 2 68 Over the objection of claimant's attorney, the hearing examiner introduced into evidence a number of
unsworn medical reports of doctors who were not present at the
hearing and did not testify. The examiner also allowed a doctor
who had been flown to the hearing by the agency to testify as an
expert. The doctor had never examined the claimant and his testimony consisted of his "interpretation" of the absent doctors'
unsworn medical reports; he interpreted them in such a way as to
indicate that Perales was not disabled. 26 9 The procedure was typical of that followed in SSA disability hearings.
The Court rejected the claim that the SSA procedure violated
270
Perales' right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses
against him. 2 71 A written report by an examining physician may be
received in evidence despite its hearsay character and an absence
of cross-examination. The APA guarantee of cross-examination does
not change the result, since it allows the admission of hearsay as
long as it is relevant.2 7 2 The Court emphasized the claimant's right
to subpoena examining physicians as witnesses. However, this right
is more theoretical than real where, as is usually the case, the
266. 402 U.S. at 410. Since the Perales decision the SSA hearing officer has
been vested with the title of administrative law judge. See Act of Mar. 27, 1978, Pub.
L. No. 95-251, § 2(a)(1), (b)(1), (b)(2), (d)(1), 92 Stat. 183 (to be codified in scattered
sections of 5 U.S.C.).
267. 402 U.S. at 410.
268. Id. at 392-98.
269. Id. at 396.
270. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
271. 402 U.S. at 410.
272. Administrative Procedure Act § 7(d), 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (1976).
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claimant is not represented by counsel. It is hard to disagree with
the dissent's position that the agency's use "of its stable of defense
doctors without submitting them to cross-examination is the cutting
of corners-a practice in which certainly the Government should
273
not indulge."
Findings and Informal Hearings
The Burger Court is the first Supreme Court to deal with a
new administrative procedure technique that is halfway between
the traditional, formal regulatory-type hearing and no procedure at
all. The technique developed as the focus of our administrative law
began to shift from the older areas of regulatory administration,
which are covered by the formal APA requirements, 274 to newer
areas that reflect the assumption of new functions by government.
An informal hearing technique has been developing in some of
these areas as a compromise between the full panoply of the APA's
formal adversary procedure and the rejection of all procedural
rights. This procedure is increasingly employed in administrative
decisions regarding the future use of land or the institution of certain types of governmental services. For example, there are over
twenty instances in the area of land acquisition where public hear2 75
ings are provided for by federal statute.
The public hearing technique is more analogous to the public
local inquiry procedure followed in Great Britain 27 6 than the formal adjudicatory procedure established by the hearing requirements
of the APA. Significantly, the informal hearing procedure has been
developed in both countries in similar fields. 27 7 The reason becomes apparent if we look at the purpose served by a hearing procedure in a field such as land acquisition. In this area the procedure is not intended to serve as a trial-type proceeding, but to
provide some means of giving those affected an opportunity to present their side, without imposing the requirements of a trial on the
relevant agency. From this perspective, the public inquiry or hearing technique is more a device to allow citizen participation in the
whole decisionmaking process than a technique for arriving at a
specific decision, as in a formal APA hearing. It is a forum for
273.
274.
275.
REv. 165,
276.

402 U.S. at 414 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
Administrative Procedure Act § 7, 5 U.S.C. § 556 (1976).
See Wexler, The Public Hearingin Federal & State Legislation, 21 AD. L.
167 (1969).
See H. WADE, ADMINISTRATiVE LAw 186-218 (4th ed. 1977).

277. B. ScnwARTZ & H. WADE, LEGAL CONTROL OF GOVERNMENT 137 (1972).
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information-gathering and an instrument of community persuasion
more than it is a trial. This was confirmed in Citizens to Preserve
Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe. 2 78 At issue was a decision of the Secretary of Transportation authorizing release of federal funds for
construction of an expressway, part of which was to go through a
public park. The statute required a "public hearing" before the
construction could be authorized. 27 9 But the Court held that the
2 80
required hearing "is nonadjudicatory, quasi-legislative in nature."
As "a 'town hall' type meeting . . . not intended to be a quasijudicial or adversary legal type hearing," 2 81 its purpose is to inform
the community about the proposed project and to elicit community
views on the design and route.
The end result of a formal APA hearing is a decision supported by adequate findings on all the material issues presented in
the record. Overton Park holds that this need not be true of the
decision that follows an informal public hearing. The relevant statutes prohibit the Secretary from approving any program or project
that involves use of parkland unless there is no feasible and prudent alternative, and the program's plan minimizes the harm to the
park. 28 2 In Overton Park the Secretary's announcement approving
the construction was not accompanied by any findings indicating
whether any feasible and prudent alternative routes existed or
why design changes could not reduce the harm to the park. The
Court ruled that formal findings were not required2 8 3 and conceded that this undoubtedly will hamper review of the Secretary's
action. The Court indicated that this problem can be overcome by
having the reviewing court require that the Secretary provide some
explanation so the court can determine if the statutory standard has
been met. This may include requiring the officials who participated
in the decision to give testimony. The normal rule against probing
the mental processes of administrative decisionmakers must give
way where there are no formal findings; the sole means of attaining
effective review may be by examining the decisionmakers themselves. 28 4 As I have written elsewhere, -[o]ne wonders whether
this reopening of the Pandora's Box closed shut by the fourth
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.

401 U.S. 402 (1971).
Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1968, § 18(a), 23 U.S.C. § 138 (1976).
401 U.S. at 415.
Lathan v. Brinegar, 506 F.2d 677, 691 (9th Cir. 1974) (citations omitted).
Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1968, § 18(a), 23 U.S.C. § 138 (1976).
401 U.S. at 409.
Id. at 420.
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Morgan case was really necessary"; requiring findings supported by
2 85
the record would surely have been preferable.
Bias and Concentration
The Burger Court has dealt with two important related issues
that have caused difficulty in administrative procedure: Decisionmakers' bias, and the concentration of functions. It has further
refined the rule disqualifying judicial and administrative adjudicators who are biased. Ward v. Village of Monroeville2 86 reaffirmed
the holding in the leading case of Tumey v. Ohio, 28 7 while broadening it to indicate that the proscribed financial stake need not be
as direct or positive as it appeared to be in Tumey. 28 8 Ward, like
Tumey,involved convictions in a mayor's court for traffic offenses.
In Tumey the mayor had shared directly in the fees and costs
levied against violators. In Ward the mayor was responsible for village finances; the mayor's court, through fines, forfeitures, costs,
and fees provided a major part of the village's income. The difference was not decisive. The Court held that the trial was not before
the disinterested and impartial adjudicator demanded by due pro2 89
cess.
Gibson v. Berryhill 290 involved a direct claim of institutional
bias in an agency. The Alabama Board of Optometry charged licensed optometrists with unprofessional conduct because they were
employed by a corporation. 291 By statute the board could be composed only of optometrists in private practice. 29 2 The Court held
that the board was disqualified by personal interest. 2 93 Success in
the board's efforts in the case would redound to the personal benefit of the board members, since they competed with the optometrists employed by corporations. One may wonder whether the
Court was fully aware of the ramifications of its bias holding. It is
common for regulatory agencies to be composed of people drawn
from the businesses and occupations regulated. They all have a fi285. B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 137, § 142, at 428 (citing United States v.
Morgan, 313 U.S. 409 (1941)). See National Nutritional Foods Ass'n v. FDA, 491 F.2d
1141, 1146 (2d Cir. 1974).
286. 409 U.S. 57 (1972).
287. 273 U.S. 510 (1927).
288. 409 U.S. at 60.
289. Id. at 58-60.
290. 411 U.S. 564 (1973).
291. Id. at 567.

292. ALA. CODE tit. 46, §§ 192, 206 (1940). See 411 U.S. at 570 n.7.
293. 411 U.S. at 578-79.
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nancial interest, in the Court's sense, in cases before them. Are
such agencies to be disqualified by potential bias? If they are, it
may be difficult to obtain people with knowledge of the regulated
field willing to serve on these agencies. On the other side, however, there is the agency's tendency to confuse the public interest
with that of the regulated group to which, its members belong. A
licensing law such as the Alabama optometry law enables the dominant group in an occupation to set up a present-day version of the
guild system, with the licensing requirement a euphemism for a
guild-type monopoly.

2 94

Friedman v. Rogers,2 95 already discussed in another connection, narrows these possible Gibson ramifications. In this more recent decision the Court rejected a due process attack upon the
composition of the Texas Optometry Board where the governing statute2 96 required two-thirds of the agency members to be members
of the professional organization of optometrists in private practice. 29 7 Friedman reaffirmed that under Gibson a commercial optometrist has a due process right to an impartial hearing in any
board disciplinary proceeding against him.2 9 8 In Gibson the Court
examined whether personal interests precluded an impartial
hearing after disciplinary proceedings were actually instituted. In
Friedman the challenge to the board's fairness did not arise from
an actual disciplinary proceeding. Tying together both Gibson
and Friedman, the result is that an agency composed of or dominated by representatives of those regulated is not per se invalid.
However, its proceedings can be challenged on the ground of the
members' personal interests. When an agency is set up in the manner of the Texas Optometry Board, it is difficult to conceive of any
disciplinary proceeding against a commercial optometrist in which
the four professional optometrists on the board do not have a sufficient personal interest within the Gibson rule, since they may benefit professionally from any disciplinary action imposed on their
commercial competitor.
Claims of bias have arisen in connection with one of the central features of our administrative organization-that of the so294. This was pointed out many years ago by Justice Peckham before his elevation to the Supreme Court. People ex rel. Nechamcus v. Warden of the City Prison,
144 N.Y. 529, 543, 39 N.E. 686, 690-91 (1895) (Peckham, J., dissenting).
295. 440 U.S. 1 (1979). See text accompanying notes 12-16 supra.
296. See TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 4552-2.02 (Vernon 1976).
297. 440 U.S. at 17-18.
298. Id. at 18.
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called concentration of functions. The issue of concentration, once
highly controversial, has largely been resolved by the separationof-functions provisions of the Federal APA. 2 99 But concentration
may still be a problem in cases not governed by the APA's provisions or in state agencies. Withrow v. Larkin300 arose out of the
acts of the Wisconsin Medical Examining Board. After an investigation, the board determined that appellee physician had engaged in
proscribed acts. The lower court enjoined the board from suspending the physician's license because the board did not satisfy
the procedural due process requirement of having an independent
decisionmaker rule on the merits of the charges it itself had inves30
tigated. '
The Supreme Court reversed. 30 2 The Court's opinion recognizes that a fair trial by a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due
process. This bars a biased decisionmaker. However, the combination of investigative and adjudicative functions does not necessarily
create an unconstitutional risk of bias. The Court conceded that the
concentration issue was "substantial" and one with which legislators
and others involved with the operation of agencies had properly
been concerned. 30 3 But that hardly supports "the bald proposition
applied in this case by the District Court that agency members
who participate in an investigation are disqualified from adjudicating." 30 4 On the contrary, there is no broad rule that agency
members may not investigate, institute proceedings, and then adjudicate. "The mere exposure to evidence presented in nonadversary investigative procedures is insufficient in itself to impugn the
fairness of the Board members at a later adversary hearing." 305
The holding that the combination of investigative and adjudicatory functions does not, without more, violate due process
scarcely breaks new ground. The lower courts had consistently rejected due process attacks against concentration. 306 In Withrow the
299. Administrative Procedure Act § 5(d), 5 U.S.C. § 554(d) (1976).

300. 421 U.S. 35 (1975).
301. 368 F. Supp. 796, 798 (E.D. Wis. 1973) (per curiam), rev'd, 421 U.S. 35

(1975).
302. 421 U.S. 35 (1975).
303.

Id. at 51.

304. Id. at 52.
305. Id. at 55.
306. See B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 137, § 111, at 320 (citing FTC v. Cinderella
Career and Finishing Schools, Inc., 404 F.2d 1308, 1315 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Amos
Treat & Co. v. SEC, 306 F.2d 260, 267 (D.C. Cir. 1962); National Harness Mfrs.'
Ass'n v. FTC, 268 F. 705, 707-08 (6th Cir. 1920)).
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Supreme Court gave its imprimatur to this jurisprudence. 30 7 It
should be stressed, however, that there is a fundamental distinction between constitutionality and desirability. Concentration may
not be subject to due process attack, but it leaves the litigant with
an uneasy feeling. Withrow's confirmation that the remedy is not
in the courts only emphasizes the widespread need for statutory
separation provisions at least as strong as those in the Federal
APA.
Administrative ProcedureAct Requirements
The Burger Court has emphasized the importance of the administrative law judge corps set up under the Federal Administrative Procedure Act. In Butz v. Economou,30 8 the Court's most
significant recent decision on the tort liability of administrative
officers, the Court went out of its way to discuss the role of
the modem federal hearing examiner or administrative law judge,
which the Court says is "'functionally comparable" to that of a
judge. 30 9 The Court described in detail the functions of these
agency hearing officers and stressed their judicial-type independence. "In light of these safeguards, we think that the risk of an
unconstitutional act by one presiding at an agency hearing is
clearly outweighed by the importance of preserving the independent judgment of these men and women." 31 0 The considerations
that led to absolute immunity for judges apply equally to agency
personnel entrusted with adjudicatory authority.
However, the Court has taken a narrow approach to the applicability of the APA's adjudication requirements, 31 1 ruling that they
do not apply to NLRB proceedings under section 10(k) of the National Labor Relations Act, which provides for a speedy hearing on
union jurisdictional issues. 31 2 This issue arose in InternationalTelephone & Telegraph Corp. v. Local 134, 3 13 in which a hearing was
held, pursuant to section 10(k), before an NLRB attorney, and the
Board eventually found against respondent in the jurisdictional
dispute. Respondent refused to comply, and the Board's General
Counsel issued a complaint upon an unfair labor practice charge.
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.

421 U.S. at 58.
438 U.S. 478 (1978).
Id. at 513.
Id. at 514.
Administrative Procedure Act § 5, 5 U.S.C. § 554 (1976).

312.

Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, § 101, 29 U.S.C. § 160(k) (1976).

313.

419 U.S. 428 (1975).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1980

45

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 8, Iss. 2 [1980], Art. 2
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 8:325

At that hearing the General Counsel was represented by the same
attorney who had presided over the section 10(k) hearing. The
Board issued a cease and desist order, but the lower court refused
to enforce it, finding that the APA separation-of-functions provisions 314 had been violated because the same person had performed
the functions of section 10(k) hearing officer and prosecutor of the
subsequent unfair labor practice charge. 31 5
The Supreme Court held that the APA separation-of-functions
requirements did not apply to a section 10(k) hearing because section 5 of the APA applies only to an "adjudication." 3 16 The APA
defines "adjudication" as "the agency process for the formulation of
an order"; 317 "order" is defined as "the whole or a part of a final disposition... of an agency." 3 18 The section 10(k) hearing did not result in a "final disposition" within the meaning of the APA. The
Board did not order anybody to do anything at the conclusion of
the proceeding; its determination was analogized to an advisory
opinion, and therefore a section 10(k) hearing did not involve an
"adjudication" subject to section 5 of the APA.
One may question whether the Court construed the APA in
the "hospitable" manner it has otherwise indicated is the proper
judicial attitude toward such broadly remedial legislation. 31 9 Coercive decree is not the exclusive hallmark of an adjudicatory order.
What would the Court say about a declaratory order that does not
order anybody to do anything yet is plainly subject to section 5 of
the APA? What is clear is that the Court permitted an actual prosecutor in a case to preside at an adjudicatory hearing at an earlier
stage of the case. It is hard to conceive of anything more violative
of the spirit, even if the Court is right on the letter, of the APA.
Notice
Fundamental to the law of administrative procedure is the
right to notice upon the commencement of a proceeding. According to the Court, "[t]he purpose of notice under the Due Process
Clause is to apprise the affected individual of, and permit adequate preparation for, an impending 'hearing.' "320 Accordingly,
314. Adminstrative Procedure Act § 5(d), 5 U.S.C. § 554(d) (1976).
315. 486 F.2d 863, 865-66 (7th Cir. 1973), rev'd, 419 U.S. 428 (1975).
316. 419 U.S. at 444-48.
317. Administrative Procedure Act § 2(d), 5 U.S.C. § 551(7) (1976).
318. Id. § 2(d), 5 U.S.C. § 551(6).
319. See, e.g., Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro, 349 U.S. 48, 51 (1955); Heikkila v. Barber, 345 U.S. 229, 232 (1953).
320. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 14 (1978).
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the Court has tried to ensure that the agency adequately apprises
those affected. The notice required in a municipal utility-termination-of-service case does not comport with constitutional requirements when it does not advise the customer of the availability of a
procedure for protesting the proposed termination. In a different
context, perhaps, a person threatened with deprivation of a protected interest need not be told "how to complain." Here, however, lay customers of various levels of education, experience, and
resources should be informed clearly of the availability of an opportunity to present their complaint, including where, when, and be32
fore whom disputed bills may be considered. '
Another type of notice involves an agency's power to take notice of facts that are obvious and notorious to it as an expert in its
particular area of administration. An aspect of official notice was involved in a case involving review of Federal Communications Commission regulations 322 barring future ownership of stations by an
owner of the only newspaper in the community. 32 3 The Commission had refused to require dissolution of most existing broadcastnewspaper combinations. The court of appeals held that the FCC
had acted arbitrarily in not providing for divestiture of all existing
combinations because the record did not adequately disclose the
extent to which divestiture would actually threaten the competing
policies relied upon by the Commission. 3 24 The Supreme Court reversed. 3 25 According to the Court, to the extent that factual determinations were involved in the FCC's "decision to grandfather
most existing combinations, they were primarily of a judgmental or
predictive character." 3 26 Therefore the Court held that "complete
factual support in the record for the Commission's judgment or
prediction is not possible or required." 32 7 This conformed with an
earlier decision, Market Street Railway v. Railroad Commission,3 28
involving findings predicting the effect of a rate reduction in
stimulating carrier traffic, where the Court held that the forecast
321. Id. at 14 n.15.
322. 40 Fed. Reg. 6,471 (1975), as amended by 40 Fed. Reg. 24,733 (1975), as

amended by 41 Fed. Reg. 25,008 (1976) (current version at 47 C.F.R. § 73.636(c)
(1979)).
323. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC, 555 F.2d 938 (D.C. Cir.
1977), affd in part and rev'd in part, 436 U.S. 775 (1978).
324. Id. at 965.
325. FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775 (1978).
326. Id. at 813.
327. Id. at 814.
328. 324 U.S. 548 (1945).
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necessarily involves deductions based on the expert knowledge of
329
the agency.
Findings
The decision of the Burger Court in Atchison, Topeka & Santa
Fe Railway v. Witchita Board of Trade3 30 has helped foster a judicial movement from the traditional requirement of findings to one
of reasoned explanation of agency decisions. In Atchison the Court
remanded a case to the ICC because the Commission had not
stated its reasons with sufficient clarity to justify its order. The order departed from the ICC's long-standing rule governing charges
for inspection of grain in transit. 33 ' Although the Court did not say
so expressly, it seemed to be demanding an explanation beyond
the findings requirement when the agency departed from an established policy it had previously followed. There is at least a presumption that the act will be carried out best if the agency adheres
to the settled rule: "From this presumption flows the agency's duty
to explain its departure from prior norms." 332 This demand for a
fuller explanation when an agency departs from precedent has been
echoed in the lower courts, and an increasing number are demanding reasons when an agency deviates from established policies
or refuses to follow precedents. 3 33 In such a case, the agency "cannot be permitted simply to abandon the rules of the game ad
libitum. Some explanation is due both the parties and the reviewing court when a decision is made that conflicts with relevant
precedent.334
The Atchison decision, as it is being followed by the lower
courts, may help to fill in the lacuna in the law left by the previously discussed Overton Park decision.3 3 5 Although formal findings
need not be made in an Overton Park-type case, the agency may
still be required to disclose its reasons for a decision, particularly
where the decision is a departure from the agency's established
policy.
329.

Id. at 560-61.

330. 412 U.S. 800 (1973).
331. Inspection in Transit, Grain and Grain Products, 339 I.C.C. 364, 385
(1971). See 412 U.S. at 816, 826.
332. 412 U.S. at 808 (citation omitted).
333. E.g., Pennsylyania v. ICC, 561 F.2d 278 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 1011 (1978); Brennan v. Gilles & Cotting, Inc., 504 F.2d 1255 (4th Cir. 1974).
334. Waterways Freight Bureau v. ICC, 561 F.2d 947, 955 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (emphasis in original).
335. 401 U.S. 402 (1971). See text accompanying notes 278-284 supra.
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JUDIcIAL REvIEw: AVAILABILITY

Review Preclusion
During the past decade there has been increasing emphasis on
the need for judicial review as a safeguard against administrative
abuses. In the Burger Court that emphasis has developed into a
presumption in favor of review. The Court asserted a decade ago
that "[t]here is no presumption against judicial review and in favor
of administrative absolutism." 33 6 On the contrary, review is the
rule and nonreviewability an exception that must be demonstrated:
action adjudicating
"[P]reclusion of judicial review of administrative
33 7
private rights is not lightly to be inferred.Dunlop v. Bachowski338 illustrates the strong policy of the
present Court in favor of judicial review. An unsuccessful candidate
for labor union office filed a complaint with the Secretary of Labor
alleging violations of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (LMRDA). 339 He invoked the provision requiring
the Secretary to investigate the complaint and decide whether to
bring a civil action to set aside the election. 34 0 After investigation
the Secretary decided that such an action was unwarranted; respondent challenged the Secretary's decision as being arbitrary and
capricious and filed an action to order that suit be filed to set aside
the election. 34 1 The Secretary argued that his decision was not subject to review. 342 The LMRDA did not expressly prohibit review,

and the Court held that absent a prohibition the Secretary "bears
the heavy burden of overcoming the strong presumption that Congress did not mean to prohibit all judicial review of his decision." 3 43 The Court found this burden had not been met. At most,
the materials the Secretary relied on suggested that Congress had
not addressed the matter. This was insufficient to overcome the
presumption by "clear and convincing evidence" that Congress
3
meant to prohibit all judicial review. 44

A statute may, on its face, give "clear and convincing evi336. Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150,
157 (1970) (citation omitted).
337. Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 166 (1970) (citations omitted).
338. 421 U.S. 560 (1975).
339. §§ 401-403, 29 U.S.C. §§ 481-483 (1976).
340. Id. § 402(b), 29 U.S.C. § 482(b) (1976).
341. Brief for Respondent at 8, Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560 (1975).
342. Brief for Petitioner at 8, Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560 (1975).
343. 421 U.S. at 567.
344. Id. (citations omitted).
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dence" of a legislative intent to preclude review. Such evidence is
to be found in the broadside bar against review in the statute governing the Veterans' Administration (VA). 345 Yet the present Court
has held that even such a no-review clause does not prohibit all judicial review. In Johnson v. Robison346 the VA had denied educational benefits to a conscientious objector who had completed two
years of required alternate civilian service, relying on statutory
provisions that denied "eligible veteran" status to such an individual. 347 Appellee challenged the statute's constitutionality on first
and fifth amendment grounds. 348 The Court held that the district
court had jurisdiction despite the no-review clause. A no-review
clause does not "preclude judicial cognizance of constitutional challenges to the veterans' benefits legislation." 349 Such challenges obviously do not contravene the purposes of the no-review clause";
further there is no "clear and convincing evidence" that Congress
intended to preclude them. 350
What happens, however, if the intent of the legislature to cut
off review meets the "clear and convincing evidence" test? May the
legislature cut off judicial review entirely, or is there a due process
right of review? The Supreme Court has never addressed these
key questions. According to two dissenting Justices, 351 a 1973 per
curiam affirmance answered the questions sub silentio. In Ortwein
v. Schwab 352 the majority affirmed that the imposition of a twentyfive dollar filing fee for indigents seeking judicial review of agency
decisions reducing their welfare payments did not violate due process of law. It is, however, difficult to see how the majority decision answers the question whether judicial review can be entirely
precluded. To uphold a nominal uniform filing fee is not to hold
that the state can cut off review entirely, whether rights or entitlements are being restricted. To those who have urged that due
345. Act of Sept. 2, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-857, § 211(a), 72 Stat. 1115 (current
version at 38 U.S.C. § 211(a) (1976)). This provision provides that
the decisions of the Administrator on any question of law or fact under any
law administered by the Veterans' Administration ...shall be final and conclusive and no other official or any court of the United States shall have
power or jurisdiction to review any such decision by an action in the nature
of mandamus or otherwise.
346. 415 U.S. 361 (1974).
347. 38 U.S.C. §§ 101(21)(A), 1652(a)(1), 1661(a) (1976).
348. Brief for Appellee at 21-57, Johnson v. Robinson, 415 U.S. 361 (1974).
349. 415 U.S. at 373.
350. Id. (citation omitted).
351. Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656, 661 (1973) (per curiam) (Douglas, J., dissenting); id. at 665 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
352. 410 U.S. 656, 660 (1973) (per curiam).
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375

process does require some judicial review, it is significant that the
two dissenting members of the Court expressly agreed with this
view.
Another aspect of review preclusion arises under the introductory language of the judicial review chapter of the APA, which provides that APA review is not available "to the extent that . . .
agency action is committed to agency discretion by law." 3 53 The
present Court has refused to accept the view that this language
precludes review of discretionary administrative acts. In the previously discussed case of Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v.
Volpe, 35 4 an action was brought to enjoin the Secretary of Transportation from releasing federal funds for the construction of part of
an expressway through a public park. A statute allowed park land
to be used only if no feasible or prudent alternative exists, and
only if harm to the park was minimized; it was contended that the
Secretary had violated this prohibition. 35 5 The Court rejected the
claim that the Secretary's decision fell within the exception for action committed to agency discretion. "This is a very narrow exception" that "is applicable in those rare instances where 'statutes, are
drawn in such broad terms that . . . there is no law to apply.' "356
Here the statutory prohibition contained an explicit bar against
the building of highways through parks except in the specific instances stated. In such a situation, there was a standard to apply
and the exemption for action committed to agency discretion was
inapplicable.
The prevailing theme in construing the APA language, as
Overton Park demonstrates, is to extend the availability of judicial
review. This is further shown by another case already discussed,
Chrysler Corp. v. Brown. 35 7 The Court held that APA review was
available of an agency's decision to disclose employment data furnished by a governmental contractor. The Chrysler Court ruled
that the Trade Secrets Act05 8 did not authorize disclosure. Though
that statute did not create a private right of action, petitioner could
353. Administrative Procedure Act § 10 (introductory clause), 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2)
(1976).
354. 401 U.S. 402 (1971). See text accompanying notes 278-284 supra.
355. Brief for Petitioner at 32, Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe,
401 U.S. 402 (1971).
356. 401 U.S. at 410 (quoting S. REP. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1945))
(footnote omitted).
357. 441 U.S. 281 (1979). See text accompanying notes 92-99, 139-147 supra.
358. Trade Secrets Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1976).
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obtain review of the agency disclosure decision. Petitioner was a
person "adversely affected or aggrieved" within the meaning of section 10(a) of the APA, 359 and since the Trade Secrets Act places
substantive limits on agency disclosure action, such action is not
"committed to agency discretion" so as to bar application
of the
360
general APA rule of reviewability.
Other decisions go further than Overton Park and Chrysler
'3 61
and allow review even where there may be no "law to apply.
An example is Barlow v. Collins,3 62 where the Secretary of Agriculture was empowered to 'prescribe such regulations, as he may
deem proper to carry out the provisions of this chapter.' "363 The
Court rejected the argument that this broad language committed
the content of the regulations wholly to the Secretary's discretion. 3 64 It reaffirmed that judicial review would be restricted
"'only upon a showing of "clear and convincing evidence"
of a contrary legislative intent.' "365 Thus, the Court confines the exception
for agency discretion to situations where the relevant statute shows
some positive intention to eliminate review. "Indeed, judicial review of such administrative action is the rule, and nonreviewability
an exception which must be demonstrated." 36 6 Under this interpretation, the APA simply restates the previous law, and infringes
the principle of reviewability only where Congress itself shows an
intention to infringe upon it. The exception of action "committed
to agency discretion by law" accordingly adds little or nothing to
3 67
that of cases where "statutes preclude judicial review."
Administrative ProcedureAct and Review Jurisdiction
Although Chrysler Corp. v. Brown held that APA review of
an agency decision could be obtained, this does not mean that the
APA itself can be construed as an independent grant of review jurisdiction. This was made clear in Califano v. Sanders.3 6 8 Sanders
359.
360.
361.
(footnote
362.
363.
(1976)).
364.
365.
(1967)).
366.
367.
(1976).
368.

Administrative Procedure Act § 10(a), 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1976).
Id.
401 U.S. at 410 (quoting S. REP. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1945))
omitted).
397 U.S. 159 (1970).
Id. at 165 (quoting Act of Apr. 27, 1935, § 4(3), 16 U.S.C. § 590(d)(3)
Brief for Respondents at 18-27, Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970).
397 U.S. at 167 (quoting Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 141
Id. at 166 (citation omitted).
Administrative Procedure Act § 10 (introductory clause), 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2)
430 U.S. 99 (1977).
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arose out of a decision by the Secretary of HEW not to reopen a
previously adjudicated claim for disability benefits. The court of appeals had held that review was not authorized under the relevant
Social Security Act section, 3 69 but that review was available under
section 10 of the APA,3 7 0 which contained an independent grant of
subject matter jurisdiction.3 71 The Supreme Court recognized that
the APA evinced Congress' intention that judicial review should be
widely available to challenge federal administrative action. In addition, the Court referred to three prior decisions that arguably had
assumed that the APA was an independent grant of subject matter
jurisdiction. 372 However, the Court said that a newly enacted statute persuaded it that the better view was that the APA should not
be interpreted as an implied grant of subject matter jurisdiction to
3 73
review agency actions.
The statute referred to was the 1976 amendment to the Judicial Code eliminating the $10,000 jurisdictional amount requirement in administrative law cases. 3 74 The "effect of this modification, subject only to preclusion-of-review statutes created or
retained by Congress, is to confer jurisdiction on federal courts to
review agency action, regardless of whether the APA of its own
force may serve as a jurisdictional predicate." 375 According to the
Court, the statute "largely undercuts the rationale for interpreting
the APA as an independent jurisdictional provision." 3 76 By filling
the jurisdictional void created by the preexisting amount-in-controversy requirement, the Court concluded Congress eliminated
the need for the APA to be interpreted in jurisdictional terms.
Sanders represents a backward step, based upon the type of
inhospitable reading of the APA that the Court itself has deplored. 77 The Court errs in assuming that "the argument in favor

369. Social Security Act § 205, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1976).
370. Administrative Procedure Act § 10, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1976).
371. 522 F.2d 1167, 1169 (7th Cir. 1975), rev'd, 430 U.S. 99 (1977).
372. 430 U.S. at 105 (citing Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe,
401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971); Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 141 (1967);
Rusk v. Cort, 369 U.S. 367, 372 (1962)).
373. Id.
374. Act of Oct. 21, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-574, § 2(a), 90 Stat. 2721 (codified in
28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1976)).
375. 430 U.S. at 105.
376. Id.
377. For a more detailed treatment of this theme, see Schwartz, Califano v.
Sanders and Administrative Procedure Act Interpretation:Has the Supreme Court's
"Hospitable"Attitude Given Way to a More Restrictive Approach?, 55 TEx. L. REV.
1323 (1977).
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of APA jurisdiction rests exclusively on . . . the shortcomings of
federal mandamus jurisdiction." 3 78 Those shortcomings were only
part of the rationale behind the case for the APA as a source of review jurisdiction; there is also the broader policy against unreviewable agency action. By holding that the APA does not provide an independent source of review, the Court allows the SSA
provision in Sanders and similar statutes to preclude review of certain agency decisions. This is further illustrated by Shaughnessy v.
Pedreiro,379 the strongest pre-Sanders holding to assume that the
APA is an independent grant of review jurisdiction. Pedreiro was
not cited in Sanders. If the Sanders approach had been followed in
Pedreiro, review would not have been available in that case, and
aliens seeking to challenge deportation orders might still be relegated to habeas corpus review. 3 80 It is true that many of the practical effects of Sanders are mitigated by the 1976 amendment to the
Judicial Code on which the Court relies; in virtually all cases,
nonstatutory review actions can now be brought under that provision. But cases like Pedreiro and Sanders show that there may still
be a lacuna in the availability of review that this amendment does
not wholly fill.
PrimaryJurisdiction
The Supreme Court has developed two related doctrines to
deal with the issue of the proper timing of review actions: Primary
jurisdiction, and exhaustion of administrative remedies. So far as
the first of these is concerned, the decisions of the Burger Court
have not followed a consistent pattern. The two important primary
jurisdiction cases during the past decade reach conflicting results
that are difficult to reconcile.
The first of these is the Court's decision in Ricci v. Chicago
Mercantile Exchange.381 Petitioner brought an antitrust action
charging respondents with restaint of trade in violation of the
Sherman Act 3 82 for transferring petitioner's membership in the
383
Chicago Mercantile Exchange to another person. He alleged
that the transfer without notice and hearing violated the rules of
378. 430 U.S. at 106 (citations omitted).
379. 349 U.S. 48 (1955) (alien can obtain judicial review of deportation order).
380. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9; 349 U.S. at 351.
381. 409 U.S. 289 (1973).
382. §§ 1-6, 8, as amended by Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act, Pub.
L. No. 93-528, § 3, 88 Stat. 1708 (1974) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976)).
383. Brief for Petitioner at 10, Ricci v. Chicago Mercantile Exch., 409 U.S. 289
(1973).
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both the Exchange 384 and of the Commodity Exchange Act.3 8 5 The
Court held that the antitrust proceeding should be stayed until the
Commodity Exchange Commission could pass on the validity of respondents' conduct under the Commodity Exchange Act, even
though the Commission had no jurisdiction to decide whether the
Act and rules immunized conduct from the antitrust laws. 38 6 The
Court ruled that the determination of whether the Exchange's
rules were violated required a factual determination within the
special competence of the Commission. This determination would
assist the court in considering the antitrust claim and arriving at
the essential accommodation between the antitrust and regulatory
38 7
schemes.
Four dissenting Justices stressed that petitioner was a private
citizen with no legal right to any agency action. 388 The relevant
statute did not provide petitioner with a means to require the agency to consider his case.3 8 9 Thus he was remanded to a procedure
that he had no power to invoke, in which he had no right to participate if it were invoked, and which could not provide the treble
damage remedy he sought even if he were allowed to participate.
The majority held that these factors were irrelevant. The need for
prior agency resolution was not lessened by the absence of any legal right of access to the administrative forum. If agency proceedings were "sought in vain, there would be no further problem for
the antitrust court."3 9 0 But what of the time and money lost by petitioner in having to seek the administrative remedy if there is no
right to invoke agency jurisdiction?
Ricci marks the culmination of the primary jurisdiction cases
that began two decades earlier. 3 91 It is anomalous to require petitioner to seek an agency determination of whether the rules it is
charged with enforcing were violated when the agency has already
shown by its inaction that it sanctions the alleged violation. The dissent wryly noted that "[b]y remanding, we are requiring the peti384. RULES OF THE CHICAGO MERCANTILE EXCHANGE, Rules 307 (1969) (current version at RULES OF THE CHICAGO MERCANTILE EXCHANGE, Rules 103, 104
(1980)); id. Rule 322 (current version at RULES OF THE CHICAGO MERCANrTILE EXCHANGE,

Rules 401, 924 (1980)).

385. §§ 1-13, 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-22 (1976).
386. 409 U.S. at 302.
387. Id. at 305-06.
388. Id. at 311 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (joined by Douglas, Stewart, and
Powell, JJ.).
389. Commodity Exchange Act § 8a, as amended by Act of Feb. 19, 1968, Pub.
L. No. 90-258, § 23, 82 Stat. 26 (current version at 7 U.S.C. § 12(a)(7) (1976)).
390. 409 U.S. at 304-05 n.14.
391. See Far E. Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570 (1952).
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tioner to seek from the regulators an admission of their failure to
regulate (or negligence in regulating)." 392 A more rational approach
is that stated by Justice Marshall in his Ricci dissent: "An agency
cannot have primary jurisdiction over a dispute when it probably
lacks jurisdiction in the first place." 393 The alternative is a result
that "needlessly bifurcates and complicates a suit that could readily be resolved by the District Court," which alone has jurisdiction
to grant the full relief sought. 394 The road that Ricci requires the
litigant to travel to obtain justice is long and expensive and avail395
able only to those with large purses.
Ricci should be compared with the decision three years later
in Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc. 39 6 That case arose out of an ac-

tion by the famous consumer advocate for damages against the
airline, which had refused him his reserved seat on a flight because
all the seats were occupied. 397 The action was a common law tort
action based on an alleged fraudulent misrepresentation arising
from the airline's failure to apprise petitioner of its deliberate
overbooking practices. The lower court held that the action must
be stayed pending reference to the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB)
for determination of whether respondent's practice was deceptive
within the meaning of section 411 of the Federal Aviation Act, 398
which provides that the Board may investigate and determine
whether any air carrier has engaged in unfair or deceptive practices. 399 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the primary jurisdiction doctrine was not applicable because the issue raised did
not involve technical questions of fact uniquely within the expertise
400
and experience of an agency.
If the Nader decision stood alone, one would have little difficulty in agreeing with its resurt. Why should plaintiff be forced
into a lengthy and burdensome proceeding in an agency that has
no jurisdiction over his cause of action and no power to award the
desired remedy? But Ricci had applied the primary jurisdiction
doctrine to bar a judicial remedy prior to resort to an agency in a
comparable case. The Court states that in Nader "considerations of
392. 409 U.S. at 309 (Douglas, J., dissenting).

393.
394.
395.
396.
397.
398.
399.
400.

Id. at 310 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Id. at 309 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
426 U.S. 290 (1976).
Id. at 293.
Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 411, 49 U.S.C. § 1381 (1976).
512 F.2d 527, 544 (D.C. Cir. 1975), reo'd, 426 U.S. 290 (1976).
426 U.S. at 307.
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uniformity in regulation and of technical expertise do not call for
prior reference to the Board." 4 0 ' It is hard to see, however, why
the reasonableness of the overbooking practice is not as much
within the specialized competence of the regulatory agency as the
practices involved in Ricci. The Nader opinion emphasizes that
40 2 that
consumers have no right to initiate proceedings in the CAB;
was true in Ricci as well.
Perhaps we must conclude, as indicated at the outset of this
discussion, that the two principal Burger Court decisions on primary jurisdiction are simply inconsistent. Prior to Nader a district
court summed up the federal rule governing primary jurisdiction:
Whenever the doctrine of primary jurisdiction requires that
administrative questions be decided first by the ICC, the district
court must refer such questions to the Commission even if the
ICC has no power to award damages or otherwise grant the relief sought, and even if plaintiff has also alleged a violation of the
railroad's duties under the common law.403
One may wonder whether such a statement, consistent though it
may be with the Supreme Court decisions until Ricci, is compatible with the Nader case.
Exhaustion of Remedies
Five years ago, the present Court summarized the rationale
for the exhaustion rule. Exhaustion of administrative remedies
is generally required as a matter of preventing premature interference with agency processes, so that the agency may function
efficiently and so that it may have an opportunity to correct its
own errors, to afford the parties and the courts the benefit of its
experience and expertise, and to compile a record which is adequate for judicial review.4 0 4
A debatable aspect of the exhaustion rule was involved in
Moore v. City of East Cleveland.40 5 At issue was a municipal housing ordinance that limited occupancy of a dwelling unit to mem401. Id. at 304.
402. Id. at 302.

403. ICC v. Baltimore & Annapolis R.R., 398 F. Supp. 454, 468 (D. Md. 1975)
(footnotes omitted), aff'd per curiam, 537 F.2d 77 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
859 (1976).
404. Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 765 (1975) (citation omitted).
405.

431 U.S. 494 (1977).
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bers of a single family.4 0 6 The Court ruled that the ordinance
violated due process, since it defined "family" in such a way as to
40 7
make it a crime for a grandmother to live with her grandson.
Chief Justice Burger dissented on the ground that appellant had
failed to exhaust her administrative remedies; her deliberate refusal
to file an application for a variance to exempt her from the ordinance's restrictions should foreclose her from pressing in court any
40 8
constitutional objections to the zoning ordinance.
The Chief Justice's dissent contains a useful summary of the
exhaustion doctrine's rationale: "[A]bsent compelling circumstances
. . . the avenues of relief nearest and simplest should be pursued
first."-40 9 Thus, according to the dissent the exhaustion rule applies
where a constitutional issue is raised. Indeed, asserts the Chief
Justice, exhaustion may be required precisely because constitutional issues are present: to avoid unnecessary adjudication of those
issues by giving the administrative agency an opportunity to re41 0
solve the matter on nonconstitutional grounds.
One may, however, question whether the logic of the exhaustion rule requires it to go as far as the Chief Justice urges. Supreme Court decisions require exhaustion even in cases where constitutional issues are raised, but only where the constitutional
challenge is to an agency's application of a statute. 41 ' This should
not be the case where the constitutionality of a statute or other act
is challenged as invalid on its face. In such a case the administrative process is unlikely to contribute to the resolution of the
challenge. Moore indicates that the majority of the present Court
accepts the rule that where constitutionality of a statute or other act
is challenged on its face, rather than as applied, exhaustion should
4 12
not be required.
The Moore opinion also deals with another important aspect of
the exhaustion issue. In a footnote the Court states that the exhaustion requirement is "wholly inappropriate where the party is a
criminal defendant in circumstances like those present here."4 1 3 It
is not clear, however, how far the Court meant to go by this state406. Housing Code of the City of East Cleveland, Ohio, § 1341.08 (1966) (defines family); id. § 1351.02 (limits occupancy of dwelling unit to single family).
407. 431 U.S. at 499.
408. Id. at 521 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
409. Id. at 524 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
410. Id. at 526 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
411. See B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 137, § 178.
412. 431 U.S. at 497 n.5.
413. Id. (emphasis omitted) (citations omitted).
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ment. The Court went on to say that it had never applied the exhaustion principle to foreclose a criminal defendant from asserting
the unconstitutionality of a statute under which he or she is prosecuted. 4 14 This implies that a criminal defendant may assert only
facial invalidity of a statute without first exhausting other remedies. 415 However, the present writer and others who have urged
that exhaustion should not be required in a criminal case 41 6 may
find support in the Court's further statement that those cases
denying constitutional defenses to criminal defendants for failure to
exhaust did so pursuant to statutes that mandated such a holding. 4 17 Such statutes put defendants on notice that failure to
pursue available administrative relief may result in forfeiture of
defenses in a criminal enforcement proceeding. Therefore, absent a
comparable statute mandating exhaustion, criminal defenses may
be raised despite lack of exhaustion.
Yakus Redivivus?
My position that exhaustion of administrative remedies should
not be required in a criminal case is based on the view that the
policy in favor of exhaustion should give way to the overriding policy of the sixth amendment-that a criminal defendant should be
given a full trial on all aspects of the crime with which he or she is
charged. 4 18 This includes being able to assert that no crime was
committed because the agency act he or she is accused of violating
was itself invalid.
The conflict between the sixth amendment and administrative
law principles also arises in other issues concerning availability of
review. It is a basic constitutional principle that the sixth amendment guarantees a fair trial to a criminal defendant in which the
defendant can dispute every element of the alleged crime with
which he or she is charged. 41 9 It is a basic administrative law principle that a defendant in an enforcement proceeding cannot attack
the legality of the administrative rule or order that he or she is
charged with violating if the defendant did not take advantage of a
statutory provision for obtaining judicial review when the rule or
414. Id.
415. See, e.g., McGee v. United States, 402 U.S. 479, 484, 491 (1971).
416. See, e.g., B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 137, § 174.
417. 431 U.S. at 497 n.5.

418. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
419.

See, e.g., Rosen v. United States, 161 U.S. 29, 34 (1896); E. CoRwiN, THE

CONSTrrUTION 420 (14th ed. 1978).
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order was issued, and the statute indicates that there shall be no
review in the enforcement proceeding. What happens when these
two basic principles conflict?
In the celebrated case of Yakus v. United States42 0 the Court
ruled that the administrative law principle must prevail. The provision in the Yakus statute for exclusiveness of the statutory review
procedure4 2 1 was held to deprive the criminal court of the power
to consider the validity of the regulation as a defense to a prosecution for its violation. 422 To critics, Yakus results in the splitting of a
criminal trial into segments; unlike other criminal defendants, one
accused of violating an administrative rule or order can be convicted on what amounts to a trial in two parts, or in the alternative, on a trial that shuts out what may be the most important of
3
the issues material to one's guilt.
This writer has asserted that Yakus should be treated as a wartime aberration; the splitting of the criminal case permitted there
should, absent a war emergency, be considered contrary to the
sixth amendment. 424 In his concurring opinion in Adamo Wrecking
Co. v. United States42 5 Justice Powell indicated agreement with
this view. 42 6 The Yakus statute, he said, can be viewed as a valid
exercise of congressional war powers. Without a comparable war
emergency, the Yakus shortcutting of normal due process rights is
unjustified. Yakus does not foreclose the issue of the constitutional
validity of preclusion provisions in nonwar power statutes in the
context of a criminal prosecution. 42 7
The Adamo majority avoided the Yakus issue by judicious interpretation of the governing statute so as not to preclude judicial
challenge to the agency order at issue in the case. The case arose
out of a prosecution for violating an Environmental Protection
Agency emission standard. The statute provided that, in an emission standard enforcement proceeding, civil or criminal, the
standard itself would not be subject to review.4 2 8 The lower court
420. 321 U.S. 414 (1944).
421. Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, ch. 26, §§ 203-204, 56 Stat. 23 (repealed 1946).

422. 321 U.S. at 435.
423.

See, e.g., id. at 489 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).

424. See B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 137, § 194.
425. 434 U.S. 275 (1978).
426. Id. at 290 (Powell, J., concurring).
427. Id. at 291 (Powell, J., concurring).

428. Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, § 307(b), 84 Stat. 1708
(current version at 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-5 (1976)) (amended 1977).
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385

held Yakus applicable.A2 9 The Supreme Court ruled that Yakus did
not bar consideration of the defense that the regulation at issue was
not an "emission standard" and hence outside the preclusion provision. 4 30 On the merits of that defense, the Court held that the regulation in question was a work practice standard and not an emission standard. 43 1 Hence its validity could be challenged in the
criminal prosecution.
Standing
Three years after Warren E. Burger became Chief Justice,
Judge Friendly expressed doubt about a proposal by this writer
and an English colleague that we follow the English practice of not
demanding standing as a prerequisite to judicial review: 432 "One may
. . . endorse recent relaxation of the requirement of standing . . .
without agreeing to its abolition."4 3 3 The Burger Court has followed Judge Friendly's view. While it has relaxed standing requirements, it has certainly not eliminated them. For example, in
Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War4 34 the Court
refused to allow standing in an action brought by citizens and taxpayers challenging the armed forces reserve membership of members of Congress. The lower courts had held that respondents had
standing to sue as representatives of the class of all United States
citizens, but not as taxpayers. 4 3 5 The Supreme Court reversed,
holding that standing was lacking in the citizen suing qua citizen. 4 36 Though the cases have broadened the categories of judicially cognizable injury, they have not abandoned the requirement
that the party seeking review must have suffered an injury. Standing may not be predicated upon an interest held in common by all
members of the public. The necessary personal stake only exists
where the action challenged as unlawful causes the complaining
party to suffer "some particularized injury that sets him apart from
the man on the street." 437 The Court held this to be lacking here.
429.
430.
431.
432.
433.
434.
435.

545 F.2d 1 (6th Cir. 1976), rev'd, 434 U.S. 275 (1978).
434 U.S. at 278.
Id. at 288.
B. SCHWARTZ & H. WADE, supra note 277, at 291.
Friendly, Foreword to id. at xx.
418 U.S. 208 (1974).
323 F. Supp. 833, 840 (D.D.C. 1971), affd mem., 495 F.2d 1075 (D.C. Cir.

1972), rev'd and remanded, 418 U.S. 208 (1974).

436. 418 U.S. at 222-23.
437. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 194 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
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Critics have focused on some of the Burger Court's standing

decisions as too restrictive. 4 38 From a broader point of view, however, it cannot be doubted that the past decade has seen a dramatic broadening of standing, which has opened the courtroom
doors to ever-wider classes of would-be plaintiffs. The high bench's
jurisprudence on standing has had an impact that extends beyond
the still-arcane mysteries of administrative law. 4 39 The narrow concepts of standing that prevailed not too long ago were appropriate to a
legal system geared only to hearing John Doe's private claim
against Richard- Roe. If public interest claims are to be considered
adequately in today's legal system, the concept of who is able to
vindicate a public interest must be accordingly expanded.
The Burger Court articulated its basic standing test in the
1970 case of Association of Data Processing Service Organizations,
Inc. v. Camp."40 To have standing, plaintiffs must show (1) that the
challenged agency act caused them "injury in fact," and (2) that the
alleged injury was to an interest "arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated" by the statutes involved. 441 This
writer has criticized this test as being needlessly complex, 4 42 and
instead favors a state court decision that rejected the bipartite injury test in favor of a single "injury in fact" test. 443 If an agency act
causes injury to plaintiff, that should suffice to allow standing to
challenge the act, unless the injury itself is too remote.
Such criticism of Data Processing should not overlook the
present Court's accomplishment in broadening the law of standing to meet the needs of much public interest litigation. The result
has been what Justice Powell has termed a "revolution in standing doctrine." 4 " One of the most important developments is
the abolition of the "legal interest" requirement. In Data Processing the Court did away with the requirement that a plaintiff allege invasion of a legally protected interest. "The 'legal interest'
test goes to the merits."445 When standing is at issue, the question
438. See, e.g., Lewin, Avoiding the Supreme Court, N.Y. Times, Oct. 1, 1976,

§

6 (Magazine), at 31.

439. This is underscored by a full-column article on standing in the New York
Times. N.Y. Times, Feb. 19, 1974, at 9, col. 1.
440. 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
441. Id. at 153.
442. See B. SCHWARTz, supra note 137, §158.
443. New Hampshire Bankers Ass'n v. Nelson, 113 N.H. 127, 302 A.2d 810
(1973).
444. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 194 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring).
445. 397 U.S. at 153.
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is whether plaintiff is a proper party to seek review, not "whether,
on the merits, the plaintiff has a legally protected interest that defendants action invaded. '"4 6 Whether the harm comes within the
concept of "legal wrong" is irrelevant to the existence of standing.
Equally significant has been the relaxation of the requirement
of "pocketbook injury." Under Data Processing, plaintiff must show
"injury in fact-economic or otherwise." 4 47 The present Court has
emphasized that standing is no longer confined to those who can
show economic harm; nor does the number of persons sharing the
same injury constitute sufficient reason for denying standing to any
person who has in fact suffered injury. 448 "Aesthetic and environmental well-being, like economic well-being, are important ingredients of the quality of life in our society, and the fact that particular environmental interests are shared by the many rather than the
few does not make them less deserving of legal protection through
the judicial process.'449
United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP) 4 50 illustrates how far the Court has gone in giving
effect to noneconomic interests. An environmental association
formed by law students brought an action challenging Interstate
Commerce Commission regulations that allowed railroads to collect
a 2.5% surcharge on freight rates pending adoption of selective rate
increases. 4 51 SCRAP alleged that the higher rate structure would
discourage the use of recyclable materials, causing further consumption of forests and other natural resources and resulting in
more refuse and undisposable materials that would pollute the environment. 4 52 The Court held that SCRAP had standing, relying
on the allegation that their members used the forests, streams,
mountains, and other natural resources in the Washington, D.C.,
area for recreation. Thus SCRAP would be given the opportunity
to show such use would be disturbed by the adverse environmental
impact caused by the use of nonrecyclable goods brought about by
4 53
the rate increase.
446. Id. at 171 (Brennan, J., concurring in the result and dissenting) (citation

omitted).
447. Id. at 152.
448. See United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures
(SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669, 686 (1973).
449. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734 (1972).
450. 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
451. Id. at 674.
452. Brief of Appellee at 58, United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory
Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
453. 412 U.S. at 688.
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The cases during the past generation have shown a continuing
"enlargement of the class of people who may protest administrative
action. The whole drive for enlarging the category of aggrieved
'persons' is symptomatic of that trend." 4 54 The Court has extended
that category to competitors and consumers-first to consumers
asserting a pocketbook interest and then to those alleging noneconomic injuries. 4 55 SCRAP extends standing to "consumers of
the environment," even those whose interests reflect an "attenuated line of causation." 4 56 SCRAP indicates that any identifiable
injury in fact may be enough to confer standing, no matter how
remote. This is a major step toward doing away with the standing
requirement altogether. The Court may be moving toward
permitting citizens at large to litigate any administrative decision
45 7
that falls in an area of interest to them.
JUDICIAL

REVIEW:

SCOPE

Review Without Record
Prior to the Burger Court, the prevailing theory of the proper
scope of judicial inquiry on review had centered upon the
substantial-evidence rule. This principle provided that "the scope
of judicial review over administrative action is limited to . . .
whether or not the findings of fact underlying the administrative
4 58
conclusion are based upon substantial evidence."
There is no doubt that the substantial-evidence rule governs
agency proceedings where a formal record is kept. Under Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 45 9 the reviewing court must determine whether the agency fact findings are supported by substantial
evidence in the record considered as a whole. 4 60 The test governing review of agency adjudications made without a formal hearing and record was laid down in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park,

454. Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations v. Camp, 397 U.S.

at 154.
455. See B. SCHVARTZ, supra note 137, §§ 159-160.
456. 412 U.S. at 688.
457. Id. at 723 (white, J., dissenting). For a more recent decision indicating
this, see Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59

(1978).
458. Wade, Foreword to B. SCHWARTZ, AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW at vi
(1950) (emphasis omitted).
459. 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
460. Id. at 487-88.
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Inc. v. Volpe. 4 61 At issue was the Secretary of Transportation's authorization of the use of federal funds to finance construction
of a
highway through a public park despite a statutory prohibition
against such construction if a "feasible and prudent" alternative
route is available. The statute required a public hearing to
inform
the community about the proposed project and to elicit their
views
on the design and route. 462 This hearing was not the
formal
adjudicatory hearing required under the APA. 4 63 "It is
not designed to produce a record that is to be the basis of
agency
action-the basic requirement for substantial-evidence review." 464
Hence, the Court held, the substantial-evidence test was not
the
applicable standard by which to review the Secretary's action.
Instead, the reviewing court must determine whether the approval
of
the construction was, under the APA, " 'arbitrary, capricious,
an
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.' -465
This amounts to a reasonableness standard. The "court must
be
able to find that the Secretary could have reasonably believed
that
in this case there are no feasible alternatives or that alternatives
do
involve unique problems." 466 Since the test under the substantialevidence rule is essentially one of reasonableness, one wonders
whether, in practice, the arbitrary-capricious standard does
not
make for a similar scope of review. As Judge Friendly put
it, review under the "arbitrary and capricious" standard as opposed
to
the substantial-evidence standard "is semantic in some degree ...
[I]t is hard to see in what respect we would have treated the
question differently if we had been applying a 'substantial evidence'
test. "467

Sanctions
The present Court has continued to follow the rule that the
scope of review over agency imposition of sanctions is no broader
than that over agency action generally. In Butz v. Glover Livestock
461. 401 U.S. 402 (1971). See text accompanying notes
278-284, 354-356 supra.
See generally Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 141-42 (1973).
462. Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1968, § 18(a), 23 U.S.C.
§ 138 (1976).
463. Administrative Procedure Act § 5, 5 U.S.C. § 554
(1976).

464. 401 U.S. at 415 (citation omitted).
465. Id. at 416 (quoting Administrative Procedure Act §
10(e), 5 U.S.C. §
706(2)(A) (1976)).
466. Id.
467. Associated Indus. v. Department of Labor, 487 F.2d
342, 349 (2d Cir.
1973) (citations omitted) (footnote omitted). See B. SCmwARTZ,
supra note 137, § 211.
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Commission Co. 468 the court of appeals upheld a cease and desist
order against violating the Packers and Stockyards Act 4 6 9 while setting aside a twenty-day suspension imposed on the violator. 4 70 The
Supreme Court reversed, finding the court of appeals had exceeded the proper scope of judicial review of administrative sanctions. 47 1 The relation of sanction to policy was a matter committed
to agency discretion; the agency choice of sanction was not to be
overturned unless unwarranted in law or without justification in
fact. Nor was the sanction rendered "unwarranted in law" because
it was more severe than sanctions imposed in other cases. The
choice in the given case was to be made by the agency, not by the
4 72
reviewing court.
Here, as in other areas of administrative law, the Burger Court
has been unwilling to read in power not provided for in the governing statute. This means that if judicial review of sanctions is to
be broadened, an express statute authorizing review is needed. For
example, a New York statute permits the courts to substitute their
judgment on the penalty imposed, even if the agency sanction is
not contrary to law and is supported by substantial evidence. 473
Under the New York statute, there are no objective standards to
guide the judges in substituting their judgment on sanctions. The
result is a virtual "Chancellor's foot" dispensation of justice in the
New York review cases. 4 74 Yet, in today's much-regulated society,
may it not be important for there to be something like the residual
power of the Chancellor to mitigate injustice in penalties?
Mixed Questions and Statutory Interpretation
The most interesting scope-of-review cases are those involving
mixed findings of law and fact, particularly those applying statutory
terms to the facts of a given case. The early approach of the Supreme Court in cases involving the application of law to fact was to
treat the cases as review of law for purposes of scope of review.
Thus in FTC v. Gratz4 7 5-- the first case concerned with the power
of the newly created FTC to restrain "unfair methods of competi468. 411 U.S. 182 (1973).
469. Packers and Stockyards Act, 1921, §§ 1-2, 201-206, 301-317, 401-409,
501-505, 7 U.S.C. §§ 181-183, 191-196, 201-203, 205-218d, 221-229 (1976).
470. 454 F.2d 109 (8th Cir. 1972), reo'd, 411 U.S. 182 (1973).
471. 411 U.S. at 186-88.
472. Id. at 188-89.
473. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 7803 (McKinney 1963).
474. See B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 137, § 221.
475. 253 U.S. 421 (1920).
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tion"' 47 6 -the Court did not confine itself to the question of
whether reasonable grounds existed for the administrative conclusion that certain practices were unfair. Instead, it independently
determined the application of the statutory concept: "The words
'unfair method of competition' are not defined by the statute and
their exact meaning is in dispute. It is for the courts, not the commission, ultimately to determine as matter of law what they in4 77
clude."
FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co. 4 78 illustrates how far the
present Court has departed from the Gratz doctrine. The FTC had
issued a cease and desist order against respondent for unfairly attempting to suppress the operation of trading stamp exchanges and
other "free and open" redemption of stamps. Respondent argued
that its conduct was beyond the reach of section 5 of the FTC
act, 4 79 which it claimed permitted the Commission to restrain only
those practices that violate the antitrust laws, are deceptive, or that
are repugnant to public morals.4 8 0 The Court upheld the FTC
power to determine whether challenged practices, though posing
no threat to competition under the antitrust laws, are nevertheless
unfair methods of competition within the FTC act's prohibition. The
Court accepted "the view that the perspective of Gratz is too confined."481 It is primarily for the FTC, not the courts, to determine
whether trade practices are "unfair." Great weight is to be given to
the Commission conclusion that particular business practices fall
within the statutory concept of "unfair methods of competition."
The Court has consistently reiterated the theme of deference
to administrative interpretations. As the Court noted in an NLRB
case, "[tihe Board's resolution of the conflicting claims in this case
represents a defensible construction of the statute and is entitled to
considerable deference. "482 In another case, the rule of deference
was argued not to apply because the case concerned hospitals and
the employer hospital and not the Board was arguably the expert. 483 The Court rejected the claim:
476. Id. at 422 (citing Act of Sept. 26, 1914, ch. 311, § 5, 38 Stat. 719 (current
version at 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1976))).
477. Id. at 427.

478. 405 U.S. 233 (1972).
479. Act of Sept. 26, 1914, § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1976).
480. Brief for Respondents at 12, FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S.
233 (1972).
481. 405 U.S. at 242.
482. NLRB v. Local Union No. 103, 434 U.S. 335, 350 (1978).
483. Brief for Petitioner at 8, Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483 (1978).
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It is true that the Board is not expert in the delivery of healthcare services, but neither is it in pharmacology, chemical manufacturing, lumbering, shipping, or any of a host of varied and
specialized business enterprises over which the Act confers its
jurisdiction. But the Board is expert in federal national labor relations policy, and it is in the Board, not petitioner, that the
1974 amendments vested responsibility
for developing that pol4
icy in the health-care industry. 84
The judicial role is narrow: It is for the Board, not the courts, to
fashion rules and apply them based on its experience. Regardless of
how the Court might have resolved the question initially, deference must be given to the judgment of the agency whose special
duty it is to apply the broad statutory language to varying fact pat48 5
terns.
The rule of deference to administrative construction of statutes
was reaffirmed in Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB .486 At issue was a
Board order requiring an employer to bargain with a union over
proposed price increases for in-plant cafeteria and vending machine
food and beverages. The question was whether the cafeteria and
vending, machine prices were "terms and conditions of employment" subject to mandatory collective bargaining under the National Labor Relations Act. 4 87 According to the Court, Congress
had delegated to the Board the primary responsibility of determining the scope of the statutory language. Hence, the Board's judgment as to what is a mandatory bargaining subject was entitled to
considerable deference. To be sure, the Board's judgment was subject to judicial review, "but if. . . defensible, it should not be rejected merely because the courts might prefer another view of the
statute."488 In this case, the Board's view that in-plant food prices
and services were mandatory bargaining subjects was not an unreasonable or unprincipled construction of the statute, and it must
therefore be accepted and enforced.
Despite these Supreme Court reaffirmations of the deference
doctrine, the doctrine is being subjected to increasing doubt in an
era of growing malaise about the administrative process. As Judge
Bazelon put it a few years ago, it is no longer enough for the courts
perfunctorily to uphold agency action "with a nod in the direction
484. Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483, 501 (1978).
485. See Bayside Enterprises, Inc. v. NLRB, 429 U.S. 298, 304 (1977).
486. 441 U.S. 488 (1979).
487. §§ 8(a)(5), (d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5), (d) (1976).
488. 441 U.S. at 497 (citation omitted).
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of the 'substantial evidence' test, and a bow to the mysteries of administrative expertise.- 48 9 The lower courts, at least,
have begun to look more closely at claims of agency expertise.
Though the deference doctrine limits review power over substantive determinations, it is within the scope of the court's oversight
responsibilities to ascertain whether the agency applied the correct
legal standard. 490 While courts may not be experts in the particular
administrative area, they "do try, however, to develop some expertise about integrity. In overseeing the administrative process,
our primary goal should not be to insure 'correct' decisions, but to
49 1
preserve the integrity of the decision-making process."Constitutionaland JurisdictionalFact
Despite continuing academic interest, the doctrines of socalled "constitutional" and "jurisdictional fact" have largely been
discarded. In the area of personal rights, however, there may still
be room for application of those doctrines. In particular, commentators have assumed that, despite the demise of Ohio Valley Water
Co. v. Ben Avon Borough492 and Crowell v. Benson, 4 93 the rule of
Ng Fung Ho. v. White, 49 4 under which a claim of citizenship in a
deportation case is subject to de novo review, is still good law.
This assumption was recently confirmed in Agosto v. INS, 495 where
the Court stated that "the Constitution requires that there be some
provision for de novo judicial determination of claims to American
citizenship in deportation proceedings." 4 96 A resident of this country has a right to de novo determination of a claim to citizenship,
because this is a "fact" upon which both congressional and agency
power to order deportation depend.
Since 1961, the Ng Fung Ho rule of de novo review of citizenship claims has been given statutory effect. An amendment to the
Immigration Act provides for direct review in courts of appeals of
deportation orders, but carves out an exception for cases in which

489.

Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584, 597

(D.C. Cir. 1971) (footnotes omitted).
490. See American Airlines, Inc. v. Secretary of Labor, 578 F.2d 38 (2d Cir.
1978).
491. Barnes Freight Line, Inc. v. ICC, 569 F.2d 912, 923-24 (5th Cir. 1978).
492. 253 U.S. 287 (1920).
493. 285 U.S. 22 (1932).
494. 259 U.S. 276 (1922).
495. 436 U.S. 748 (1978).
496. Id. at 753 (citation omitted).
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citizenship is claimed; in these cases, de novo review in district
49 7
court is expressly made available.
Agosto indicates that Congress provided this exception in recognition of the constitutional basis of the Ng Fung Ho rule.498
Aside from cases involving the personal right of citizenship, the
"constitutional" and "jurisdictional fact" doctrines have all but
"slipped into oblivion." 49 9 It is unfortunate that the Court has not
seized the occasion expressly to confirm this development. In fact,
Crowell v. Benson has been cited by two members of the present
Court with no hint that its doctrine has been discredited. 500 Yet, in
Northeast Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo50 1 the Court was concerned with deciding whether workers were "employees" and met
the "situs test" under the 1972 amendments to the Longshore50 3
men's Act: 50 2 the same statute involved in Crowell v. Benson.
The findings at issue in Caputo appear to be the very two "jurisdictional' findings that, under Crowell v. Benson, are subject to
full review in a trial de novo. 50 4 The governing case would thus
seem to be Crowell; yet it was not mentioned in the Court's opinion. Does this mean that it has at last earned the repose Justice
50 5
Frankfurter once asserted it deserved?
TORT LIABILITY

The Burger Court has been ambivalent concerning the scope
of the federal government's tort liability. It expressly reaffirmed
Dalehite v. United States, 50 6 the most restrictive decision interpreting the Federal Tort Claims Act. 50 7 This decision drastically
497. Act of Sept. 26, 1961, § 5(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1105a (1976).
498. 436 U.S. at 753 (citing H.R. REP. No. 1086, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1961);
H.R. REP. No. 565, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1961)).

499. See Rockport Yacht & Supply Co. v. Hollis, 371 F. Supp. 1229, 1232 (S.D.
Tex. 1973).
500. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 102 n.20 (1973) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting); Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656, 666 (1973) (per curiam) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
501. 432 U.S. 249 (1977).
502. Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act Amendments of
1972, § 2(c), 33 U.S.C. § 903(a) (1976).
503. See Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, ch. 509, 44
Stat. 1424 (1927) (current version at 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (1976)).
504. 285 U.S. at 55.
505. Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114, 142 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). For a more recent case following the Northeast Marine Terminal approach, see
P.C. Pfeiffer Co. v. Ford, 100 S.Ct. 328 (1979).
506. 346 U.S. 15 (1953), cited with approval in Laird v. Nelms, 406 U.S. 797,
802 (1972).
507. 28 U.S.C. §§1346(b), 2671-2680 (1976).
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limited that statute's remedial intent to make the federal government liable in tort on the same basis as private individuals. On the
other hand, the Court has recently reopened the door to tort suits
against administrative officers, which had all but been closed by
50 8
the broad rule of officer immunity laid down by a 1959 decision.

GovernmentalLiability
After the broad trend toward expansion of governmental tort
liability during this century, 50 9 the decision in Laird v. Nelms 5 10
appears to be a backward step. The Court held that damage from
sonic booms caused by military planes was not actionable under
the Tort Claims Act if no negligence was shown in either the
planning or operation of the flights. 51 1 The Court concluded that
though Congress intended to make the government liable under
respondeat superior, it did not intend to impose liability based
solely on the ultrahazardous nature of an activity undertaken by
government. 512 The Court expressly reaffirmed the decision in
Dalehite, which held that the Act did not authorize the imposition
of strict liability of any sort upon the federal government. 5 13 The
Laird decision is unfortunate. The Tort Claims Act makes the
United States liable for "negligent or wrongful acts" in those cases
where a private employer would be held liable. 5 14 Under applicable tort law, a private person who creates a sonic boom is absolutely liable for any injuries caused thereby. 5 15 The creation of a
sonic boom is thus a "wrongful act" within the Tort Claims Act. To
hold otherwise is to create an exception in a case covered by the
express language of the Act.

Officer Liability
Though the Burger Court has thus taken a restrictive approach
to liability under the Tort Claims Act, its decision in Butz v.
Economou 51 6 has given substance to the ancient boast of the com508. See Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959).
509. See B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 137, §§ 198-201.
510. 406 U.S. 797 (1972).

511. Id. at 799.
512.

See H.R. REP. No. 1287, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1945); S. REP. NO. 1400,

79th Cong., 2d Sess. 31 (1946).
513. 406 U.S. at 802.
514. See 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1976).
515. See Prentiss v. National Airlines, 112 F. Supp. 306 (D.N.J. 1953); Guilford
Realty & Ins. Co. v. Blythe Bros. Co., 260 N.C. 69, 131 S.E.2d 900 (1963); B.
SCHWARTZ, supra note 137, § 199, at 568; Peck, Laird v. Nelms: A Call for Review
and Revision of the Federal Tort Claims Act, 48 WASH. L. Rtv. 391 (1973).
516. 438 U.S. 478 (1978).
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mon law that public officers have no immunity from the sanctions
of law applicable to private individuals. 517 In this century the common law rule of officer liability had increasingly given way to one
of officer immunity. The trend in that direction culminated in Barr
v. Matteo, 518 where absolute immunity from tort liability was extended to virtually the entire federal bureaucracy acting within
"the outer perimeter of [their] line of duty," even where malice
was alleged. 519
All this may have been changed by Butz. The Department of
Agriculture had brought a proceeding to revoke the registration of
respondent's commodity futures commission company. After a
hearing, the Department's Chief Hearing Examiner recommended
revoking the license. The Judicial Officer, to whom the Secretary
had delegated his decisional authority, affirmed; this order was vacated on judicial review. 520 Respondent filed an action for damages
against numerous officials, alleging that by instituting unauthorized
proceedings they had violated his constitutional rights, including
violation of his right to procedural due process. 521 The Government moved to dismiss on the ground that the individual defendants, as federal officials, were entitled to absolute immunity for all
discretionary acts within the scope of their authority. The Court
ruled that dismissal should be denied, holding that federal officials
are not absolutely immune from liability for damages where they
knowingly infringe upon an individual's constitutional rights. 522
In the Court's view, because the conduct complained about in
Butz was not within the outer limits of the officials' duties, the case
was not controlled by Barr. The reasoning in the Barr opinion indicates that a different question would have been presented had
the officer ignored a statutory or constitutional limitation on his authority: "[W]e are confident that Barr did not purport to protect an
official who has not only committed a wrong under local law, but
also violated those fundamental principles of fairness embodied in
the Constitution."523
517. W. GELLHOBN & C. BYSE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 290 (5th ed. 1970) (3d
ed. 1954).
518. 360 U.S. 564 (1959).
519. Id. at 575. See B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 137, § 196 (citing Carter v.
Carlson, 447 F.2d 358, 361 (D.C. Cir. 1971), rev'd on other grounds, 409 U.S. 418
(1973); Reich v. Freeport, 388 F. Supp. 953, 956 (N.D. Ill. 1974)).
520. Economou v. United States Dep't of Agriculture, 494 F.2d 519 (2d Cir.
1974) (per curiam), reo'd, 438 U.S. 478 (1978).
521. Brief for Respondent at 22, Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978).
522. 438 U.S. at 507.
523. Id. at 495 (footnote omitted).
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Thus a federal official may not with impunity ignore the limitations the law places on his or her powers. The official is protected
from liability from tortious acts only if the acts are authorized by
controlling federal law. Barr did not purport to abolish the liability
of federal officers for actions beyond their line of duty. If they are
accountable when they stray beyond the limits of statutory authority, it would be incongruous to hold that they may willfully or
knowingly violate constitutional rights without liability.
Butz builds upon prior decisions, particularly those in Bivens
525
v. Six Unknown Narcotics Agents 52 4 and Wood v. Strickland.
But it makes explicit what those cases had only implied: The Barr
rule of absolute immunity does not apply in tort actions charging
violations of constitutional rights. 52 6 A citizen suffering a compensable injury to a constitutionally protected interest can invoke the
general jurisdiction of the district courts to obtain an award of
monetary damages against the responsible federal official. Nor is
the right of action limited to cases brought under the Civil Rights
Act provision for civil liability of officials who deprive persons of
their constitutional rights. 52 7 On the contrary, as Bivens had implied, it applies to all damage suits against federal and state officials
that charge violations of constitutional rights. 52 8 Butz thus opens
the door to some of the liability foreclosed by Barr v. Matteo,
since tortious official conduct can frequently be described in constitutional terms. Cases where recovery has been denied under the
Barr approach can readily be recast in Butz terms: Illegal detention 52 9 can be reframed as a constitutional deprivation of liberty;
abusive treatment of prisoners 530 as infliction of punishment without due process; and a seizure of property to satisfy a pretended
tax lien 531 as a taking of property without due process. If Butz can
be pressed that far, it may allow a major extension of liability in
cases involving constitutional deprivations by public officers, even
those previously immunized under Barr.
The Court in Butz did, however, go out of its way to affirm
the immunity of officers performing adjudicatory functions in an
524.
525.
526.
527.
528.
529.
530.
531.

403 U.S. 388 (1971).
420 U.S. 308 (1975).
438 U.S. at 489.
See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976).
438 U.S. at 500-01.
E.g., Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1949).
E.g., Norton v. McShane, 332 F.2d 855 (5th Cir. 1964).
E.g., Bershad v. Wood, 290 F.2d 714 (9th Cir. 1961).
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agency. Though Butz rejected the claim of absolute immunity for
most of the officials, it did hold that absolute immunity existed for
administrative prosecuting and hearing officials, extending to them
the absolute immunity of prosecutors and judges in the judicial
process.5 32 Absolute immunity is afforded to those responsible for
the decision to initiate or continue a proceeding subject to agency
adjudication, to those agency personnel who present evidence on
the record in the course of an adjudication, as well as to those persons performing adjudicatory functions within a federal agency.
This provides a needed imprimatur of the importance of the
adjudicatory function and the elevated status of those engaged in
it. In particular the Court highlighted the status of administrative
law judges, whose judicial role and dignity require that they be
vested with the absolute immunity that shields judges in the
courts.
CONCLUSION

The law, to paraphrase Holmes, is a magic mirror wherein we
see reflected the society, its people, and its institutions. 5 33 This is
particularly true of administrative law, whose very existence has
been called forth by the societal changes that have occurred during
the past two centuries. Its history reflects the changed nature of
society and the alteration of the government's role that has occurred to deal with those changes.
The administrative law decisions of the Burger Court reflect
both the society of the past decade and the period through which it
has been passing. Inevitably the general malaise about administrative agencies has had its influence on Supreme Court decisions.
Two principal themes in the Burger Court's administrative law jurisprudence may be seen as direct responses to this growing distrust of agencies and their failure to protect the public interest
they were created to serve.
First, the availability of judicial review has been expanded,
stemming directly from doubts about agency performance and a
growing conviction of the need to submit administrative authority
to effective control. The Burger Court reflected these feelings by
erecting a virtual presumption in favor of judicial review. As the
Court stated in a 1970 case, "judicial review of. . .administrative
action is the rule, and nonreviewability an exception which must
532.
533.

438 U.S. at 508-09.
See 0. W. HOLMES,

SPEECHES 17 (1913).
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be demonstrated." 53 4 Precluding review, in Justice Douglas'
phrase, makes a "tyrant" out of every agency officer. 5 35 That situation is avoided only by ensuring access to the courts to those aggrieved by administrative actions. Availability of judicial review,
declared Justice Douglas in another case, "seems to me to be the
essence of due process." 536 Though these words were spoken in a
dissent, they reflect the present Court's attitude toward availability
of review.
The second theme in the Burger Court's administrative law jurisprudence cuts across the entire subject. Statutes that relate to
agencies must be strictly interpreted. This has resulted in a substantial change in the Court's posture toward agencies. While prior
Courts were willing to look beyond the black letter of delegating
statutes and read in implied powers in the light of presumed congressional intent to confer broadside authority, the Burger Court
has adopted a narrower approach. It no longer tends to go beyond
the legislative language and read in powers not expressly conferred.
This changed attitude of the highest Court is also a direct response to the growing distrust of agencies. The crisis in confidence
that has infected governmental institutions has had particular impact on perceptions of the administrative process in operation. Not
long before his elevation to the highest bench, then-Judge Burger
referred to the theory that an agency such as the FCC effectively
represents the public interest as
one of those assumptions we collectively try to work with so long
as they are reasonably adequate. When it becomes clear, as it
does to us now, that it is no longer a valid assumption which
stands up under the realities of actual experience, neither we
53 7
nor the Commission can continue to rely on it.
It is hardly surprising that the skeptical attitude evidenced by this
statement has had its effects on the tribunal over which its author
now presides.
In 1971 Judge Bazelon asserted that "'[w]e stand on the
threshold of a new era in the history of the long and fruitful collab534. Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 166 (1970).
535. United States v. Wunderlich, 342 U.S. 98, 101 (1951) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
536. Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656, 662 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
537. Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d
994, 1003-04 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
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oration of administrative agencies and reviewing courts. '' 53 The
Burger Court may have started another crucial swing of the administrative law pendulum. Certainly the swing appears likely to increase as the Justices, like the citizenry generally, become increasingly disenchanted with claims of administrative expertise. But it is
still too early to say whether it will culminate in a retreat from the
past generation's reconciliation between administrative and judicial
power. If it does we may ultimately expect a drastic alteration in
traditional restrictions on the scope of judicial power in administrative law cases. If agencies prove increasingly unable to meet societal needs, we can expect the courts to play a more activist role.
The Burger Court's constricted view of agency authority may foreshadow a broadening of the judicial role in administrative law, or it
may be only a temporary manifestation of the current distrust of
agencies.
From a broader perspective, the Burger Court's administrative
law jurisprudence illustrates the rapidly changing nature of our
administrative law. It has been thirty-five years since enactment of
the Administrative Procedure Act. 53 9 In terms of administrative
law development it seems longer than that. The movement that led
to the APA's enactment was part of the era of extremism in administrative law fostered by the then-recent New Deal expansion of
agency authority and the efforts of those who resisted the new governmental devices. By now, we have come to see that neither the
thrill of the New Dealers nor the chill of their opponents adequately reflected the reality of the administrative process. 540 Extremists on both sides have moved toward the middle. Thus most of the
controversy engendered by extremism has itself tended to abate.
The cases decided by the Burger Court show how the focus of
administrative law interest has shifted during the past quarter century. The key problems dealt with in those cases were not even
relevant three decades ago: procedure in rulemaking; 54 1 procedural
rights in welfare and social security proceedings; 54 2 informal hear538.

Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584, 597

(D.C. Cir. 1971).
539. Administrative Procedure Act, ch. 324, §§ 2-12, 60 Stat. 237 (current version at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706, 1305, 3105, 3344, 5362, 7521 (1976)).
540. See Jaffe, The Effective Limits of the Administrative Process: A Reevaluation, 67 HARv. L. REv. 1105, 1107 (1954).
541. See text accompanying notes 123-179 supra.
542. See text accompanying notes 180-273 supra.
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ing techniques; 543 timing of review 544 and standing; 54 5 freedom of
information; 54 6 and agency investigatory power. 547 The cases in the
1940's dealt with these matters in a rudimentary fashion if at all; in
the 1970's they were the stuff of administrative law jurisprudence.
In 1943, the Supreme Court referred to a particular area of
administrative regulation as one "the dominant characteristic of
which was the rapid pace of its unfolding." 548 In the 1970's, that
statement could be made about the entire field of administrative
law. The paramount characteristic of administrative law today is
what we may term its Heraclitean nature: The subject is in a continual state of flux, as it increasingly seeks to meet the needs posed
by changing conceptions of governmental function and expanding
expectations of those subject to public power.
543.
544.
545.
546.
547.
548.

See text accompanying notes
See text accompanying notes
See text accompanying notes
See text accompanying notes
See text accompanying notes
National Broadcasting Co. v.

274-285 supra.
336-431 supra.
432-457 supra.
72-100 supra.
101-122 supra.
United States, 319 U.S. 190, 219 (1943).
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